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The right of innocent passage has been a staple in maritime law since the 17th century and is an 
important part of the freedom of the seas, granting free passage to ships that wants to travel a 
state’s sea territory. With the growing complexity of the world however, the freedom of the 
seas is slowly being pushed away by coastal states increasing need to regulate and protect their 
own shores and waters. The 4th of July 2019, Gibraltar took the decision to take it a step further 
and decided to detain an Iranian oil tanker named the Grace 1 that was headed for Syria. The 
reason for this was to enforce EU’s economic sanctions, sanctions not in any way related to the 
right of innocent passage or Iran, a state with no responsibility to follow EU’s sanctions. With 
an already crumbling freedom of the seas, the danger of such a decision taken by an entity such 
as Gibraltar is clear. What makes this matter worse is the tool Gibraltar chose to use, economic 
sanctions. Economic sanctions are a highly criticized and volatile tool, often with terrible 
consequences to an innocent population. Gibraltar’s decision to use it for hindering the passage 
of ships risks expanding the use of such a tool as well as giving further recognition to it, 
damaging the stability of the world in the process. 
The thesis examines Gibraltar’s conduct when it detained the Grace 1 from the perspective of 
international maritime law and examines the consequences should Gibraltar’s conduct 
continue. It examines the right of innocent passage together with economic sanctions as a tool 
for limiting it and compares it to other alternatives for interdiction. The thesis concludes that if 
Gibraltar’s conduct would continue it could have a large negative impact on the right of 
innocent passage and that Gibraltar should not have interdicted the Grace 1, regardless of 
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‘For even that ocean wherewith God hath compassed the Earth is navigable on every side 
round about, and the settled or extraordinary blasts of wind, not always blowing from the same 
quarter, and sometimes from every quarter, do they not sufficiently signify that nature hath 
granted a passage from all nations unto all?’ – Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum, page 11.1 
 
1 Introduction 
The detention of the Grace 1 the 4th of July 2019 was not one that went unnoticed in the 
international community. For the duration of its detention, it was the centre of an international 
crisis between Iran and the western countries.2 The UK claimed it had detained the vessel 
lawfully, to uphold the heavy sanctions put on Syria by the European Union, while Iran on the 
other hand claimed that the detention had been done in violation of international law; even 
claiming piracy.3 Iran was however not the only one who criticized this action, and the 
comment from former Swedish prime-minister Carl Bildt quickly became popular in media 
outlets, questioning the legality of the action and stating that ‘EU as a principle doesn’t impose 
its sanctions on others. That’s what the US does’.4 The whole situation escalated when Iran in 
turn detained a UK-flagged tanker, and when the Grace 1 finally was released after promises 
from Iran that it wouldn’t go to Syria, its cargo ended up in Syria anyway.5 The UK’s victory 
was ultimately a hollow one. 
Some would perhaps argue that the incident was inevitable: Conflict between Iran and the west 
has been brewing for years, and warnings of a potential tanker-war had been issued even before 
the incident occurred.6 Economic sanctions have also become increasingly more common, and 
the threat of hindering a ships passage to Syria due to economic sanctions by the UK came as 
early as 2012, when a Russian vessel allegedly planned to ship war-material to the Syrian 
Government.7 Yet, these threats were never actualized and the UK by detaining the Grace 1 
 
1 Hugo Grotius, The Free sea (Richard Hakluyt trs, David Armitage ed and introduction, with William 
Welwod’s Critique and Grotius’s Reply, Liberty fund Indianapolis 2004) 11. Emphasis added. 
2 Verity Ratcliffe, Julian Lee, Arsalan Shahla, ’U.K. Marines Seize Tanker, Causing Diplomatic Row With Iran’ 
(Bloomberg, 4 July 2019) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-04/gibraltar-says-it-seized-oil-
tanker-carrying-crude-to-syria> Accessed 20 November 2019. 
3 Roland Oliphant, Dominic Nicholls, ‘Iran blasts Britain's 'piracy' after Royal Marines detain oil tanker in 
Gibraltar’ The Telegraph (London, 5 July 2019) (Henceforth ‘Oliphant, Nicholls’) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/07/04/royal-marines-gibraltar-detains-supertanker-suspected-
delivering/> accessed 17 November 2019. 
4 David Uren, ‘Sanctions: the new economic battlefield’ (The Strategist, 6 august 2019) 
<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/sanctions-the-new-economic-battlefield/> Accessed 19 November 2019;  
Patrick Wintour ‘Gulf crisis: story began with UK's seizure of Iranian-flagged ship in Gibraltar’, The Guardian 
(London, 20 July 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/20/gulf-crisis-tanker-retaliation-iran-
hormuz> Accessed 19 November 2019. 
5 ‘Grace 1 tanker: UK condemns Iran over Adrian Darya 1 delivery of oil to Syria’ (Sky News, 10 September  
2019) <https://news.sky.com/story/grace-1-tanker-uk-condemns-iran-over-adrian-darya-1-delivery-of-oil-to-
syria-11806407> accessed 20 November 2019. 
6 Paul Adams, ‘Gulf crisis: Are we heading for a new tanker war?’ (BBC, 21 June 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48709049> accessed 20 November 2019. 
7 Matthew Happold, ‘Economic sanctions and international law’ in Matthew Happold and Paul Eden (eds), 
Economic Sanctions and International Law (Hart Publishing 2016) 1 (Henceforth ‘Happold’) ; David Usborne, 
‘Tensions between UK and Russia soared over Syria-bound helicopters’, The Independent (London, 21 June 
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has taken an unprecedented step towards realizing its foreign objectives. What truly is 
concerning though is that although the UK’s action to detain the Grace 1 is seemingly purely 
political in nature, it has the potential to damage international law to its core. The legal 
aftermath of the UK’s decision to stop a neutral vessel due to EU’s economic sanctions in its 
territorial waters could be severe, for when dealing with international law it is not the legality 
per se that that is important, but the consequences of the action taken. If the use of economic 
sanctions for hindering vessels in a coastal state’s territorial sea or strait becomes the norm, it 
could risk eroding the very foundation of innocent passage, a rule in international law that has 
insured safe passage of every kind of ships on the seas for hundreds of years. The damage to 
innocent passage could in turn have effects to both state and non-state actors and the entire 
shipping industry. 
While the incident still could be seen as isolated and the risk to innocent passage due to that 
incident minimal, many influential states have come out with their support. The USA seems to 
have endorsed the actions in Gibraltar, and acknowledgement from large flag-states such as 
Panama signals a potential acceptance of this conduct.8 It is therefore of importance that the 
legality surrounding the incident is examined, as well as what consequences this could have. 
For while the legality of the incident is of interest, it is not the legality itself that have potential 
to affect the law on the seas, but what would happen if this conduct became accepted among 
the international community.  
 
1.1 Background 
To be able to fully discern what henceforth in this thesis will be called the ‘Grace 1 incident’, 
it is of importance to not only understand the context in which the incident happened, but also 
to understand the broader geopolitical situation surrounding the incident. Before detailing the 
events of the Grace 1 incident, what will follow first is therefore a brief account of the Syrian 
Civil War in relation to the rest of the international community, and thereafter a short summary 
of Iran’s political situation in relation to the parties involved in the Grace 1 incident. 
1.1.1 The Syrian civil war 
The Syrian Civil War has been ongoing since 2011, and is the second most deadly war of the 
21st century, only eclipsed by the Second Congo War between 1993 and 2003.9 Syria’s 
government, led by president Bashar al-Assad has been in conflict with several rebel groups 
that oppose the rule of Assad. The civil war has had both regional and international 
 
2012) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/tensions-between-uk-and-russia-soared-over-syria-
bound-helicopters-7869850.html> accessed 20 November 2019. 
8 Dan Sabbagh, ’UK caught in middle of US power play with Iran’ The Guardian (London, 15 August 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/15/uk-caught-in-middle-of-us-power-play-with-iran> accessed 
20 November 2019; Anonymous, ‘Grace 1 no longer Panama-registered’ (Insurance Marine News, 8 July 2019)  
<https://insurancemarinenews.com/insurance-marine-news/grace-1-no-longer-panama-registered/> accessed 17 
November 2019. 
9 ‘Syria civil war fast facts’ (CNN, 11 October 2019) <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/meast/syria-
civil-war-fast-facts/index.html> accessed 17 November 2019; Michael Ray, ‘8 Deadliest Wars of the 21st 
century’, Encyclopaedia Britannica <www.britannica.com/list/8-deadliest-wars-of-the-21st-century>, accessed 
17 November 2019. 
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consequences, as more international actors has decided to get involved in the conflict.10 In 
2013, the UN released a report that the Assad-government had used chemical weapons against 
their opposition, and UN’s secretary-general Ban Ki-moon accused the Assad-government of 
war crimes.11 This has led to heavy economic sanctions from major international actors such 
as the USA and the EU, but no sanctions from the UN directly relating to the Assad-
government.12 
1.1.2 Iran’s political situation 
Iran is a country under large international and economical pressure, especially from the USA 
which withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the ‘Iran nuclear deal’ in 
May 2018 and later reinstated economic sanctions that previously had been lifted due to the 
deal.13 Iran’s economy has been hit hard and the relation between Iran and the USA and its 
allies have become increasingly hostile.14 In June 2018, the USA branded the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a military organization equivalent to Iran’s military 
agency, as a Foreign terrorist organization.15 
1.1.3 The Grace 1 incident 
1.1.3.1 The detention 
While the exact details of the Grace can be questioned and the reasons behind the ships actions 
are blurred, it all seems to have started in mid-April when a large oil-tanker named the Grace 
1 departed from Kharg Island, Iran.16 Loaded with crude oil it was headed towards the 
Mediterranean Sea, but instead of going through the Suez Canal it opted to travel the 
considerably longer route around the southern tip of Africa instead. Some experts claim the 
reason for not going through the Suez Canal was because there it would have had to temporarily 
 
10 A more detailed description of who the international actors are can be found here: ‘Syria’s civil war explained 
from the beginning’ (Aljazeera, 14 April 2018) <www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-
160505084119966.html>; ‘Syria war: A brief guide to who's fighting whom’ (BBC, 7 April 2017)  
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39528673> accessed 17 November 2019. 
11 Josh Levs, Holly Yan, ‘'War crime': U.N. finds sarin used in Syria chemical weapons attack’ (CNN, 17 
September 2019) <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/16/politics/syria-civil-war/index.html> accessed 12 
December 2019. 
12 ‘Restrictive measures against Syria’ (EU Sanctions Map, 11 September 2019) 
<https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main/details/32/?checked=&search=%7B%22value%22:%22syria%22,%22se
archType%22:%7B%22id%22:1,%22title%22:%22regimes,%20persons,%20entities%22%7D%7D> accessed 9 
December 2019; ‘Syria Sanctions’ (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2 April 2019) 
<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/syria.aspx> accessed 17 November 2019. 
13 ’Iran nuclear deal: Key details’ (BBC, 11 June 2019) <www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655> 
accessed 17 November 2019; Mark Landler, ’Trump abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned’, The New 
York Times (New York, 8 Maj 2018) <www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-
deal.html> accessed 17 November 2019. 
14 ’Six charts that show how hard US sanctions have hit Iran’ (BBC, 2 May 2019)  <www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-48119109> accessed 17 November 2019; Lucia Binding, ’Iran says it's ready for war with US after 
Saudi oil attack accusations’ (Sky News, 16 September 2019) <https://news.sky.com/story/iran-says-its-ready-
for-war-with-us-after-saudi-oil-attack-accusations-11810252> accessed 17 November 2019. 
15 ’How Trump’s terrorist designation of Iran’s revolutionary guard impacts its economy’ (CNBC, 12 April 
2019) <www.cnbc.com/2019/04/12/trump-terrorist-designation-of-irans-irgc-the-economic-impact.html> 
accessed 17 November 2019. 
16 Jonathan Saul, Parisa Hafezi, ‘Tehran fumes as Britain seizes Iranian oil tanker over Syria sanctions’ 
(Reuters, 4 July 2019) <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-tanker/tehran-fumes-as-britain-seizes-iranian-
oil-tanker-over-syria-sanctions-idUSKCN1TZ0GN> accessed 20 November 2019. 
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‘unload its cargo and refill after passing through’17, which would could have put it at risk to 
seizure.18 In the beginning of July 2019, it came to the government of Gibraltar’s attention that 
an oil tanker carrying crude oil, flying a Panamanian flag, was travelling the Strait of Gibraltar 
and was heading for what they believed was Baniyas Refinery in Syria.19 Gibraltar’s chief 
minister Fabian Picardo claimed that on the basis of that information he took the decision to 
detain the ship after it had entered British Gibraltar territorial waters (BGTW).20 The Spanish 
Foreign minister commented that it was done ‘at the request of the United States’21, but sources 
within the UK’s government have denied this.22  With the help of British royal Marines, the 
ship was boarded at 2 AM the 4th of July and detained.23 At the moment of the detention, the 
ship had left the strait, and entered Gibraltar’s territorial waters due to needed repairs.24 The 
reason the ship was detained was due to potential violation of EU economic sanctions.25 
Picardo commented that the Baniyas refinery ‘is the property of an entity that is subject to 
European Union sanctions against Syria’.26 At a later date he made a similar statement, saying 
that there were ‘reasonable grounds to suspect that the Grace 1 was being used in breach of 
applicable EU Sanctions against Syria’.27 Since the ship only can be held for a limited time 
without a court-order according the Gibraltar’s Sanctions Act, on the 5th of July Gibraltar 
Supreme Court took the decision to extend the detention for fourteen days.28 This decision was 
made due to ‘reasonable grounds to consider that the detention of the Grace 1 is required for 
the purposes of compliance with the EU Regulation 36/2012 on sanctions on Syria’.29 After 
the fourteen days the court extended the detention another 30 days.30 
 
17 Jonathan Saul, Parisa Hafezi, ‘Tehran fumes as Britain seizes Iranian oil tanker over Syria sanctions’ (Reuters, 
4 July 2019) <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-tanker/tehran-fumes-as-britain-seizes-iranian-oil-tanker-
over-syria-sanctions-idUSKCN1TZ0GN> accessed 20 November 2019. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Oliphant, Nicholls. 
20 ’Chief Minister’s Statement on the release of The Grace 1 – 595/2019’ (Her Majesty’s Government of 
Gibraltar, 15 August 2019) (Henceforth ‘Chief Minister’s statement’) <https://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/press-
releases/chief-ministers-statement-on-the-release-of-the-grace-1-5952019-5187> accessed 10 December 2019; 
Specified ship notice 2019, LN. 2019/132. 
21 Oliphant, Nicholls. 
22 Andrew England, David Bond, ‘UK veers off course in Iran tanker dispute’ Financial Times (London, 22 July 
2019) <https://www.ft.com/content/f0330414-ac95-11e9-8030-530adfa879c2> accessed 20 November 2019. 
23 Chief Minister’s statement. 
24 Ibid; ’US issues warrant to seize Iranian oil tanker Grace 1’ (Aljazeera, 17 August 2019) 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/issues-warrant-seize-iranian-oil-tanker-grace-1-
190817051000847.html> accessed 17 November 2019. 
25 Oliphant, Nicholls. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Chief Minister’s statement. 
28 ‘Gibraltar Supreme Court Orders Extension of Grace 1 Detention - 515/2019’ (Her Majesty’s Government of 
Gibraltar, 5 July 2019) <www.gibraltar.gov.gi/press-releases/gibraltar-supreme-court-orders-extension-of-
grace-1-detention-5152019-5103> accessed November 2019. 
29 Ibid. 
30 ’Grace 1 Detention - 548/2019’ 2019’ (Her Majesty’s Government of Gibraltar, 19 July 2019)  




1.1.3.2 Wrong flag-state 
It was later revealed that the Grace 1 had been removed from Panama’s international registry 
on the 29th of May 2019, months before the incident.31 Panama responded that reason behind 
the delisting was due to information they had received ‘that the ship had participated in or was 
linked to terrorism financing’.32 The country of Iran instead claimed ownership, and the ship 
later changed its flag to Iranian, and renamed it to Adrian Darya.33 Panama later told reporters 
that they had decided to withdraw flags from 60 other ships that was in violation of sanctions 
and international legislation, with ties to Iran and Syria.34 
1.1.3.3 Iran’s response and the Stena Impero 
When the ship was detained in Gibraltar, Iran was quick to condemn the action, calling it both 
unlawful as well as an act of piracy.35 Iran’s state-governed media IRNA as well as Iran-
officials pointed out that the ship was traveling the strait and that neither the EU or the UK had 
any right to stop an Iranian ship based on EU unilateral sanctions, ‘extraterritorially’. 36 Iranian 
officials also claimed that the ship’s destination wasn’t Syria; a claim that was repeated during 
the whole incident, calling it ‘false allegations’.37 A high-ranking official of Iran threatened on 
social media that if the Grace 1 wasn’t released, Iran would seize a British oil tanker as 
response.38 On the 20th of July news broke that Iran detained a British flagged, Swedish-owned 
tanker, the Stena Impero in the Strait of Hormuz.39 The detention was done in Omani waters, 
and brought to Iran waters before UK navy had time to reach the ship.40 Iran said the detention 
 
31 Anonymous, ‘Grace 1 no longer Panama-registered’ (Insurance Marine News, 8 July 2019)  
<https://insurancemarinenews.com/insurance-marine-news/grace-1-no-longer-panama-registered/> accessed 17 
November 2019. 
32Ibid. 
33 Emer Scully, ’Iran CHANGES the name of its tanker Grace 1 to Adrian Darya a day after the vessel was 
released by Gibraltar - as the US issues a fresh warrant to seize it’, Daily Mail (London, 17 August 2019) 
<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7367431/Iran-changes-seized-tanker-Persian-moniker-Adrian-
Darya-issues-warrant-seize-it.html> accessed 17 November 2019. Due to the ship being named ‘Grace 1’ the 
majority of the incident, as well as being the name used in media and in official documents etc., this thesis will 
continue to address the ship as ‘Grace 1’ to avoid any confusion. 
34 Marianna Parraga, Elida Moreno, ‘Exclusive: Panama to withdraw flags from more vessels that violate 
sanctions’ (Reuters, 12 July 2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-tanker-panama-
exclusive/exclusive-panama-to-withdraw-flags-from-more-vessels-that-violate-sanctions-idUSKCN1U72DS> 
accessed 15 December 2019. 
35 Oliphant, Nicholls; ’Iran summons UK ambassador in tanker seizure row’ (BBC, 4 July 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-48871462> accessed November 2019. 
36 ’UK seizure of Iranian oil tanker amounts to sea piracy: Official’ (IRNA, 5 July 2019) 
<https://en.irna.ir/news/83381904/UK-seizure-of-Iranian-oil-tanker-amounts-to-sea-piracy-Official> accessed 
17 November 2019. 
37 Parisa Hafezi, Guy Falconbridge, ’Iran says Britain might release oil tanker soon, Gibraltar says not yet’ 
(Reuters, 13 August 2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-tanker/iran-says-britain-might-
release-oil-tanker-soon-gibraltar-says-not-yet-idUSKCN1V30J5> accessed 17 November 2019. ‘Iran says 
seized tanker was not headed to Syria, accusing UK of 'maritime robbery'’ (Middle east Eye, 7 July 
2019)<https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-says-seized-tanker-was-not-headed-syria-accusing-uk-
maritime-robbery> accessed 30 November 2019. 
38 ’Iranian official threatens to seize British oil tanker’ (BBC, 5 July 2019) <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
48882455> accessed 20 November 2019. 
39 ’Iran seizes British tanker in Strait of Hormuz’ (BBC, 20 July 2019) <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
49053383> accessed 3 December 2019; ’Fleet List’ (Stena Bulk) <https://www.stenabulk.com/our-fleet/fleet-
list> accessed 2019. 
40 ’Tanker seizure: Jeremy Hunt urges Iran to release Stena Impero’ (BBC, 20 July 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-49059066> accessed 3 December 2019. 
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was due to the ships violation of international maritime rules, but the UK denied this, instead 
calling it an act of piracy.41 What exact violation Iran claimed the ship had breached was 
unclear; first it was reported that it was for ‘turning off its tracking devices to avoid Iranian 
forces and colliding with a fishing boat’42, but was at a later date specified by Iran’s Foreign 
ministry spokesman Abbas Mousavi on social media, to be ‘violations and damages inflicted 
on the environment’.43 After Iran’s action in the Strait of Hormuz the British navy started to 
escort British ships through the strait, although due to the large amount of traffic experts have 
commented that this would not be a viable solution for the future.44  
1.1.3.4  Claims from the USA and Shurat Hadin 
The USA as well as the Israeli-activist organization Shurat Hadin both made claims on the 
Grace 1, calling for its seizure. The 15th of August 2019 the USA’s Department of Justice 
applied at Gibraltar Supreme Court to extend the detention and ultimately seize the ship.45 The 
USA’s argument was that the ship and its crew, by transporting oil to Syria, was to be 
considered helping IRGC which (as mentioned above) had been classified as a terrorist 
organization.46 The organization Shurat Hadin also got involved and supported the USA’s 
request, wanting it seized as monetary compensation for terrorist-attacks which they claimed 
Iran had supported.47 Gibraltar denied the USA’s request, a request which Iran’s Foreign 
Minister labelled as an attempt of piracy by the USA.48  
1.1.3.5 The release 
On august the 15th 2019, The Gibraltar High Court released the ship, now renamed Adrian 
Darya, after receiving a written assurance from Iran that ‘the destination of the Vessel will not 
 
41 ’Iran seizes British tanker in Strait of Hormuz’ (BBC, 20 July 2019) <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
49362182> accessed 17 November 2019. 
42 ‘Seized UK-flagged tanker Stena Impero leaves Iranian port’ (Aljazeera, 27 September 2019) 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/uk-flagged-tanker-stena-impero-seized-july-leaves-iranian-port-
190927062425000.html> accessed November 2019. 
43 ‘Stena Impero: Iran 'still investigating' seized British tanker’ (BBC, 25 September 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49826807> accessed 17 November 2019. 
44 Mo Abbas, ‘British navy to escort ships through Strait of Hormuz’ (NBC,  25 July 2019) 
<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/british-navy-escort-ships-through-strait-hormuz-n1034456> accessed 
17 November 2019. 
45 Michael Holden, ’U.S. has applied to seize Grace 1 tanker, Gibraltar says’ (Reuters, 15 August 2019) 
<www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-tanker-gibraltar-stateme-idUSKCN1V50WQ> accessed November 
17 2019; Sara Mazloumsaki, Lauren Said-Moorhouse, Vasco Cotovio, ‘Gibraltar defies US and releases seized 
Iranian tanker Grace 1’ (CNN, 16 August 2019) <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/15/middleeast/gibraltar-grace-
1-oil-tanker-gbr-intl/index.html> accessed 17 November 2019. 
46 Sara Mazloumsaki, Lauren Said-Moorhouse, Vasco Cotovio, ‘Gibraltar defies US and releases seized Iranian 
tanker Grace 1’ (CNN, 16 August 2019) <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/15/middleeast/gibraltar-grace-1-oil-
tanker-gbr-intl/index.html> accessed 17 November 2019. 
47 Bryan Reyes, ’As Iran condemns British 'piracy', Israeli organisation launches legal bid to seize Grace 1’, 
Gibraltar Chronicle (Gibraltar, 16 July 2019) <chronicle.gi/as-iran-condemns-british-piracy-israeli-
organisation-launches-legal-bid-to-seize-grace-1/> accessed 17 November 2019. They also made other 
objections, but those are irrelevant for this discussion. 
48 ’Iran oil tanker: Gibraltar orders release of Grace 1’ (BBC, 15 August 2019) <www.bbc.com/news/uk-
49362182> accessed 17 November 2019. 
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be an entity that is subject to European Union sanctions’.49 Gibraltar’s Chief Minister released 
a statement saying: 
[T]his assurance has the effect of ensuring that we have deprived the Assad regime in 
Syria of more than one hundred and forty million dollars of valuable crude oil. (…) In 
light of the assurances we have received, there are no longer any reasonable grounds for 
the continued legal detention of the Grace 1 in order to ensure compliance with the EU 
Sanctions Regulation.50  
He continued, ending his statement with:  
The net effect is that this operation has become the most successful implementation of 
the European sanctions regime to date. It also amounts to a demonstration that Gibraltar 
is a jurisdiction that acts in keeping with the law and is committed to the rules based, 
international legal order. Gibraltar can be proud of the role it has discharged in guarding 
the entrance to the Mediterranean and enforcing EU sanctions.51 
1.1.3.6 The aftermath 
The USA did not seem satisfied with the release of the Grace 1, and quickly responded by 
releasing a warrant for the seizure of it.52 The USA also allegedly tried to bribe the captain of 
the ship, as well as publicly stating a reward for anyone that could help.53 These attempts were 
unfruitful, and a couple of weeks later it travelled to the Coast of Syria, where the oil most 
likely was unloaded.54 The UK condemned Iran for this, alleging that Iran had broken their 
given assurance.55 When Chief Minister Picardo was asked about this, he responded that it was 
unclear if Iran had broken their assurance. ‘We did not have an undertaking that the oil would 
not end up in Syria. We had an undertaking from the Iranian government that they would not 
sell the oil to any EU sanctioned entity.’56 Iran later confirmed this, and told reporters that they 
 
49 Specified ship notice (LN. 2019/132) relating to the M.V. Grace 1 (IMO: 9116412) Notice of revocation of 
specification of ship, LN 2019/164, section 14 (Henceforth ‘Specified ship notice (LN 2019/164)’) ; Chief 
Minister’s statement. 
50 Chief Minister’s statement. 
51 Ibid. 
52 ’Unsealed Warrant and Forfeiture Complaint Seek Seizure of Oil Tanker ‘Grace 1’ for Unlawful Use of U.S. 
Financial System to Support and Finance IRGC’s Sale of Oil Products to Syria’ (The United States Department 
of Justice, 16 August 2019) <www.justice.gov/opa/pr/unsealed-warrant-and-forfeiture-complaint-seek-seizure-
oil-tanker-grace-1-unlawful-use-us> accessed 17 November 2019. 
53 Tom O’Connor, ’Iran mocks U.S. after it reportedly tried and failed to pay off oil tanker’ (Newsweek, 4 
September 2019) <www.newsweek.com/iran-mocks-us-after-it-reportedly-tried-failed-pay-off-oil-tanker-
1457705> accessed 17 November 2019. 
54 Josie Ensor, ’'Difficult to see' if Iran breached Syria oil sale agreement, Gibraltar chief minister says’, The 
Telegraph (London, 13 September 2019) <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/09/13/difficult-see-iran-breached-
syria-oil-sale-agreement-gibraltar/> accessed 17 November 2019. 
55 Andrew England, David Sheppard and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, ’UK claims Iran tanker broke promises with 
Syria delivery’, Financial times (London, 10 September 2019) <https://www.ft.com/content/bd00e646-d3e7-
11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77> accessed 17 November 2019. 
56 Josie Ensor, ’'Difficult to see' if Iran breached Syria oil sale agreement, Gibraltar chief minister says’, The 
Telegraph (London, 13 September 2019) <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/09/13/difficult-see-iran-breached-
syria-oil-sale-agreement-gibraltar/> accessed 17 November 2019. 
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simply had sold the oil to a private company that was not part of the EU-sanctions.57 As 
reported by Iran’s state media IRNA, the Iranian ambassador Hamid Baeidinejad explained 
that the west had misunderstood the assurance, quoting Gibraltar’s Chief Minister to support 
this view. The assurance was never about Iran promising that the oil wouldn’t end up in Syria, 
he explained. No commitment had actually been made to secure the destination of the oil, only 
what parties Iran couldn’t transfer or sell the oil to.58 
The Stena Impero was released the 27th September, over a month after the release of the Grace 
1.59 
1.1.3.7 Effects on the shipping industry 
There has been some worry that the development surrounding the Grace 1 incident would 
damage the shipping industry. The worry has mostly surrounded shipping in the Strait of 
Hormuz, and there’s been speculation that both traffic would decrease, and costs of insurances 
would increase.60 Since the situation in the Strait of Hormuz already were precarious, the fears 
were that this would escalate the conflict. So far though there has been no worry that the trade 
through the strait would completely come to a halt: Just that there would be a decrease of 
willing companies and ships.61 No major effect on the industry has although been seen as of 
yet. 
 
1.2 Scope and purpose 
1.2.1 Purpose 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine how international law would develop and how this 
would affect the right of innocent passage, if the use of unilateral economic sanctions to hinder 
the passage of ships became standard practice for Gibraltar. Its purpose is also to evaluate 
Gibraltar’s use of these sanctions to hinder the passage of ships in comparison to other viable 
alternatives. 
1.2.2 Research questions 
- Was the detention of the Grace 1 to be considered legal under international law? 
- If the conduct in the case of the Grace 1 became standard practice for Gibraltar, how 
would it affect the right of innocent passage and what consequences could that have? 
 
57 ’Envoy says Adrian Darya's oil belongs to private firm’ (IRNA, 11 September 2019) 
<https://en.irna.ir/news/83472272/Envoy-says-Adrian-Darya-s-oil-belongs-to-private-firm> accessed 17 
November 2019. 
58 ‘Enemies misinterpret Iran's commitment on Adrian Darya super tanker’ (IRNA, 14 September 2019) 
<https://en.irna.ir/news/83475208/Enemies-misinterpret-Iran-s-commitment-on-Adrian-Darya-super> accessed 
17 November 2019. 
59 ’Stena Impero: Seized British tanker leaves Iran's waters’, (BBC, 27 September 2019) 
<www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49849718> accessed 17 November 2019. 
60 David Koenig, Frank Bajak, ’Gulf tanker incidents may raise shippers’ costs, cut traffic’ (AP, 21 July 2019) 
<https://apnews.com/d7795eaf6ff343bbba9e40c1f6ec34de> Accessed 30 November 2019. 
61 David Sheppard, Anjil Raval, ’Oil tanker companies spooked by Gulf attacks’ Financial Times (London, 14 




1.2.3 Method and material 
1.2.3.1 Legal dogmatic method 
To achieve the thesis purpose, the thesis will use the Grace 1 incident as an object of study. It 
will do so via two legal methods. The main method that will be used to study the Grace 1 
incident and its surrounding questions is the legal dogmatic method. The reason for this is 
because of the incident’s legal complexity, as well as the thesis being legal in nature. The thesis 
puts the conduct of Gibraltar into the perspective of the abstract question of the conduct’s 
legality, by examining the legal rules governing the conduct as well as the legal principles 
surrounding it. Even though intent is one of the main questions of the Grace 1 incident, the 
analysis of the legality itself as part of the first research question can be attributed as a form of 
legal positivism, with the UN and the ICJ as recognized centrepieces of the conduct’s legality. 
The method has also been part of sorting out the hierarchy of norms in different legal regimes 
and in international law. With the focus on standard practice, state practice, and economic 
sanctions as a legal tool rather than a political one, the legal dogmatic method is the one most 
suitable for the task of fulfilling the purpose of the thesis. Another method would lack the 
capacity to answer these questions. 
1.2.3.2 Legal comparative method 
The secondary method that will be used is the legal comparative method. The legal comparative 
method will act as a supplement to the legal dogmatic method to be able to fully explore the 
subject. It will be used to compare economic sanctions as a legal tool to other legal tools in the 
perspective of standard practice. It will also be used to compare national legislation, 
specifically US legislation and UK legislation with each other. Without the perspective that the 
legal comparative method brings to the question the legal dogmatic method would be unable 
to fulfil the purpose of the thesis in a satisfactory way. 
1.2.3.3 Material 
The thesis is written in the referencing style ‘Oxford University Standard for the Citation of 
Legal Authorities’ (OSCOLA, 4th edn). Due to the specific legal questions being examined are 
relatively new and thus largely unexplored, cohesive research on the subject matter is missing. 
The material used therefore covers a range of different legal topics and will consequently not 
always have a direct connection to the subject matter. The legal area of sovereignty and 
jurisdiction is based on the works of Professor Martin Dixon and Professor Vaughan Lowe, 
and the foundation for the law of the sea is based on the works of Professor Donald Rothwell, 
Professor Tim Stephens and Professor Yoshifumi Tanaka. The thesis builds upon the work of 
Dr. Haijiang Yang, Jurisdiction of the Coastal State over Foreign Merchant Ships in Internal 
Waters and the Territorial Sea (2006), which analyses the right of innocent passage in the 
territorial sea and puts it in the perspective of state jurisdiction. This has allowed the thesis to 
focus on the topics of economic sanctions, interdiction and the specific circumstances 
surrounding the Grace 1, which has benefitted the thesis as a whole. 
1.2.4 Scope 
Since the thesis is of legal nature it will not speculate in questions that are purely political. It 
will not comment on any dispute regarding Gibraltar as a crown state more than acknowledging 
its existence as a crown state. It will not comment on the potential effects of the UK leaving 
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the EU (also called ‘Brexit’), due to its uncertain nature. It is not clear what effects it could 
potentially have on the application of economic sanctions by Gibraltar or its conduct, but it 
does not change the circumstances of the Grace 1 incident itself. When it comes to the question 
of jurisdiction it will only deal with jurisdiction in the territorial sea, and only of vessels that 
travels the sea, not air or land. It will not question the definition of such a vessel, and only deal 
with the right of ‘merchant vessels’ and not warships, since that is a topic of its own. The thesis 
will not go into any speculation of state-terrorism or an alternative view on piracy other than 
what has already been established by legal scholars. Even though the thesis is a legal analysis, 
it will not critique national regulations and law, as the analysis is about the application of those 
laws, not the laws themselves. When it comes to the law of conflict, the thesis does not seek to 
question the conclusions made by legal scholars in this area. Lastly, it has to be established that 
the thesis will not question the recognition of the UN, UNCLOS as customary law or the 
judgements and opinions of the ICJ; as any other position would make the work entirely 
speculative. 
1.2.5 Synopsis 
The thesis is divided into 6 chapters. The first chapter is of a non-legal nature and introduces 
the reader to the topic with needed background-information, as well as the scope and purpose 
of the thesis. The second chapter is the beginning of the main body of the thesis, named 
‘Sovereignty and jurisdiction’. It is written to give a basic understanding of the legal concepts 
and principles that the thesis is dealing with, beginning with principles in general international 
law, and ending with principles and rules specific to the law of the sea. The third chapter, 
‘Economic sanctions and interdiction’ is about the law and actions used to detain the Grace 1. 
It is more focused on the actual questions surrounding the Grace 1 incident than chapter two 
and deals with economic sanctions as a tool as well as maritime actions related to force. It also 
explores the general legality of the use of force in accordance to the UN Charter. The fourth 
chapter is named ‘The detention of the Grace 1’, and puts the findings of the second and third 
chapter in the perspective of the actual the Grace 1 incident together with new findings, 
examining Gibraltar’s conduct and goes into detail on the law relevant to the incident. Chapter 
five is called ‘The Grace 1 and interdiction based on economic sanctions’ and discusses and 
analyses the findings of the previous chapters. It does so by dividing chapter five into two 
separate sections, each section operating under its own research question. The first research 
question discusses the more basic question of the Grace 1 incidents legality, while the other is 
more focused on the concepts surrounding it and the potential consequences of Gibraltar’s 
conduct, as well as discussing alternative actions that Gibraltar could have taken. Both sections 
of chapter five ends with the answer to the research question. The sixth chapter is the 
conclusion, which summarizes and comments on what was discussed, an ends with a statement 
regarding the findings of the thesis as a whole. Every chapter except the first and the last chapter 
starts with an introduction detailing how the chapter is structured and why it is structured in 
this way, so that the reader easier can follow and understand the thesis. All of these chapters 
also have a summary of the end of the chapter, except chapter five where the summary instead 




2  Sovereignty and jurisdiction 
To be able to fully understand the Grace 1 incident in the context of maritime law, the legal 
questions surrounding the incident needs to be deconstructed. The first concept to examine  is 
what could be interpreted as the core question of the Grace 1 incident, namely the question of 
Gibraltar’s sovereignty and jurisdiction. This chapter will start with an overview of state 
jurisdiction in international law, the Lotus Case (1927) and the general principles of 
jurisdiction. The next part of chapter two concerns the law of the sea, first introducing it as a 
legal area and then moving on to the main question of jurisdiction, specifically jurisdiction in 
the territorial sea which is where the Grace 1 incident took place. After this comes a section 
dedicated to the right of innocent passage, which is the relevant exception to a coastal state’s 
sovereignty and jurisdiction in the territorial sea. On the last pages of the chapter, it examines 
the limits of innocent passage and the potential erosion of the freedom of navigation. 
 
2.1 A State’s jurisdiction 
2.1.1 Definition of jurisdiction 
International jurisdiction is one of the very foundations of international law, and is a 
multifaceted term with a collection of different kinds of international jurisdictions covering 
different areas of international law, and not a term that is used in uniform by scholars.62 The 
discussion and usage of ‘jurisdiction’ in this thesis will generally refer to specifically a state’s 
jurisdiction, if not specified otherwise. In his book about jurisdiction of a coastal state, Yang 
asserts that the terms ‘sovereignty’ and ‘jurisdiction’ needs to be separated, where sovereignty 
generally refers to a state’s personality and statehood as well as a state’s rights, while 
jurisdiction is the legal competence of aforementioned state, and that sovereignty is what 
creates jurisdiction in the first place.63 In other words, jurisdiction is a result of sovereignty, 
but can reach places where a state is not sovereign. 
2.1.2 Definition of territory 
Before going into detail on the principles of jurisdiction, it is vital to define what is to be 
considered territory. The term ‘territory’ commonly refers to a specific land mass, an area of 
land so to speak, but could also be interpreted as simply a general area in which a state has 
control.64 These two should not however be confused with each other: While a state may have 
jurisdiction in an area outside its land-borders, such jurisdiction is not what could be called 
‘territorial jurisdiction’, which only concerns land territory.65 Tanaka goes so far as to use the 
 
62 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 148 (Henceforth 
‘Dixon’); Haijiang Yang, Jurisdiction of the coastal state over Foreign Merchant Ships in internal waters and 
the territorial sea (Springer Berlin and Heidelberg 2006) 30 (Henceforth ‘Yang’).  
63 Yang 30 – 31. 
64 Albert S. Hornby, ’Territory’, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (8th edn, Joanna Turnbull (ed) and 
others, Oxford University Press, 2010); ’Territory’(Cambridge Dictionary) 
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/territory> accessed 17 November 2019; ‘Territory’ 
(Merriam-Webster) <www.merriam-webster.co m/dictionary/territory> accessed 17 November 2019. 
65 Yang 32; Dixon, 148; Vaughan Lowe, International Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 172 – 173 
(Henceforth ‘Lowe’).  
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term ‘spatial jurisdiction’ as to not confuse the two.66 Hence, when the word ‘territory’ is used 
in this thesis it will specifically be about territory as a concept that does not by default include 
territory outside its land-borders (but that possibly can be extended to include it). When there 
is a need to separate land and sea area, the terms ‘sea territory’ and ‘land territory’ will be used, 
as seen in UNCLOS.67  
2.1.3 The Lotus Case 
To best elucidate the basic concept of state jurisdiction, perhaps the most significant as well as 
relevant case to look at is the Lotus Case (1927), which is often used as the basis of explaining 
jurisdiction.68 Dixon describes this case as laying out ‘two competing general rules of 
jurisdiction’.69 The first rule is the rule that one state is not allowed to exercise its authority in 
another states territory.70 However, the other general rule, that is competing with the first, is 
that a state may exercise its authority outside its own territory if not a rule in international law 
states otherwise.71 This translates to two different kinds of jurisdiction: The jurisdiction to 
prescribe, and the jurisdiction to enforce. A state is free to make rules of what entities are 
allowed and not allowed to do, but is only able to enforce those rules in the state’s own 
territory.72 This brings forth a third rule of jurisdiction, the rule that a state has full authority 
and sovereignty over its own independent territory. Dixon describes this as the state having 
‘power and authority over all persons, property and events occurring within its territory’.73 
2.1.4 Types of jurisdiction 
2.1.4.1 Legislative jurisdiction 
As described above, there are different types of jurisdiction. First is the jurisdiction to 
prescribe; one of the general rules found in the Lotus Case.74 Yang calls this ‘legislative 
jurisdiction’ and includes ratification and accession to international conventions as part of it.75 
The jurisdiction to prescribe is unhindered by other rules, and a state can virtually make any 
kind of legislation covering any area. Dixon’s example of this is the United Kingdom’s 
Broadcasting Act 1990, which forbids broadcasting from the high seas in such a way that would 
 
66 Yoshifumi Tanaka, The international Law of the Sea (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2015) 6 
(Henceforth ‘Tanaka’). 
67 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 10 December 1982, entered into force 1 
November 1994. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol 1833 (Henceforth ‘UNCLOS’). 
68 Dixon 148;  Guilfoyle 8; ‘The Lotus Case’ (France v Turkey)’ Série A No. 10 PCIJ (1927). The Lotus Case 
was described as important only a year after the decision in 1928, as a case important not only because of the 
substance matter, but because it was the first case were the Permanent Court of International Justice decided on 
something other than a ruling or interpretation of a convention: The issue at hand was a customary one. The case 
dealt with a collision between a French Mail steamer and a Turkish collier, named Lotus and Boz-Kourt 
respectively. The collision resulted in the Boz-Kourt sinking and eight Turkish crewmembers lost their lives. 
The Lotus arrived in Constantinople and the responsible officer for the Lotus and the captain for Boz-Kourt was 
tried in court. The officer of Lotus claimed that the Turkish court lacked jurisdiction, a claim that prompted 
France and Turkey to send the question to the PCIJ, if the Turkish court had authority to judge the French 
officer. 
69 Dixon 148. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Dixon 149. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Yang 35. 
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disrupt internal broadcasts in the UK.76 While the UK might not have jurisdiction on the high 
seas, it can still forbid people to do so on the high sea.  
2.1.4.2 Enforcement jurisdiction 
Even if a state can decide to adopt any kind of rule, these rules can only be enforced in its own 
territory. This is called ‘enforcement jurisdiction’.77 It could be argued that enforcement 
jurisdiction can be divided into two separate jurisdictions, ‘judicial jurisdiction and 
administrative or executive jurisdiction’78, but the general consensus among scholars is to 
combine it into one kind of jurisdiction.79 Enforcement jurisdiction is dependent on the 
legislative jurisdiction, and it is further limited by a state’s sovereignty. As described before, 
enforcement jurisdiction therefore cannot exist outside a state’s territory or in another state’s 
territory, unless given permission by a bilateral or multilateral agreement.80  
2.1.5 Principles of jurisdiction 
2.1.5.1 The territorial principle 
The territorial principle is the bedrock of jurisdiction.81 Already mentioned as Dixon’s third 
rule of jurisdiction above, Yang describes it as ‘the most fundamental of all principles 
governing jurisdiction’.82 Lowe seems to share this sentiment, and both Lowe and Dixon ties 
other jurisdictions as an extension of a state’s jurisdiction over its territory.83 The territorial 
principle can in itself be divided into two parts: Objective territorial principle, and subjective 
territorial principle. The objective principle is that a state has the full right to decide over its 
own territory and the actors inside of it. The subjective principle is that acts that started outside 
its territory but enters/has an effect inside of its territory will also be included: For example, a 
lorry-driver’s hour is not reset just because it crosses a nation’s border.84 There are also 
arguments for the reverse use of the subjective principle; when a crime has been prepared inside 
the state’s territory but is to be executed outside its territory, the state could still claim 
jurisdiction. 85 
2.1.5.2 The nationality principle 
The nationality principle is the principle that ‘a state may exercise jurisdiction over the 
exterritorial conducts of its nationals’.86 Its origin is the idea of a ruler’s authority over its 
subjects, and is a principle that precedes the territorial principle.87 It does not mean that a state 
is obliged to do so, only that it has the right to do so.88 In practice this principle is rarely used 
on single individuals unless the crime is severe, but it is an important principle for such things 
 
76 Dixon 149. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Yang 35. 
79 Ibid 35 – 36. 
80 Dixon 149. 
81 Ibid 152. 
82 Yang 31 – 32. 
83 Lowe 172; Dixon 152. 
84 Lowe 172. 
85 Dixon 152 – 153. 
86 Yang 32. 
87 Lowe 174. 
88 Dixon 153 – 154. 
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as flag-state jurisdiction, from where the rules of flag-state jurisdiction derives.89 There are 
some states who advocate for a ‘passive personality’ principle, where a state will apply its 
jurisdiction on another states’ national through this principle, if that national injured or killed 
the state’s own national, but is not a generally accepted use of the nationality principle.90 
2.1.5.3 The protective principle 
The idea of the protective principle is that when a state’s security is under threat or will have a 
harmful effect on the state, a state may act to protect itself, wherever this act is committed.91 It 
was a principle that in the beginning of the 20th century was used in a limited fashion, but has 
since the 1980s been applied increasingly liberally to matters that does not pose any immediate 
threat to state itself.92 It is used almost exclusively on non-nationals, acting outside a state’s 
territory.93 The USA is especially known for using this principle, and not only for security 
reasons but also for economic reasons and, according to Dixon, political reasons.  Dixon makes 
the conclusion that the adoption of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity act (1996) 
and the Iran-Lybia Sanctions act (1996), which were based on the protective principle, were 
‘designed more to further US foreign policy than to protect the USA per se’.94 Such broad 
applications has been protested by the rest of the international community.95 
2.1.5.4 The universal principle 
There are some crimes that are so universally abhorrent and detested that any state has the 
jurisdiction to stop it. This is such things as piracy, slavery, torture and crimes against 
humanity.96 An example of the use of this principle is in Israel v Eichmann (1961), where it 
was said that what has occurred was not only against Israeli law. ‘These crimes which offended 
the whole of mankind and shocked the conscience of nations are grave offences against the law 
of nations itself (‘delicta juris gentium’).’97 The reasons behind universal jurisdiction is because 
of the lack of jurisdiction and even existence of international courts and other legal bodies, and 
universal jurisdiction is the alternative to this.98 
 
2.2 Law of the sea and jurisdiction on the sea 
Before examining a state’s jurisdiction on the sea specifically, it is imperative to first examine 
the source of this jurisdiction; namely the legal paradigm often called ‘the law of the sea’.99 
This chapter of the thesis will therefore start with an overview of the law of the sea and the 
principles behind it before moving on to the details of passage and jurisdiction in the territorial 
sea according to the law of the sea paradigm.  
 
89 Lowe 175. 
90 Ibid 175 – 176. 
91 Ibid 176; Dixon 156. 
92 Lowe 176. 
93 Dixon 156. 
94 Ibid 158. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid 154; Lowe 176. 
97 Israel v Eichmann (1961) District Court of Jerusalem, Criminal Case No 40/61, section 12; Dixon 154. 
98 Dixon 155. 
99 Donald R Rothwell, Tim Stephens, The international law of the sea (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2016) 1 – 2 
(Henceforth ‘Rowell, Stephens’); Dixon 217; Tanaka 3. 
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2.2.1 Overview of the law of the sea 
2.2.1.1 Historic overview 
Before the 20th century, there were little to none written law that governed the sea; instead it 
existed only as customary law.100 The main focus of customary law between the 17th century 
and the 19th century was the principle of freedom on the seas, with some disputes over sea 
territory.101 In the beginning of the 20th century it became clear that there was a need to codify 
the customary rules, and it was part of the 1930 Hague Codification Conference, but it was 
unsuccessful in codifying the customary rules on the sea. There were several more attempts to 
codify these customary rules, but the most successful try was in 1982 on the third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, with the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).102 It has to be mentioned that there was some success with the 1958 Geneva 
Convention before UNCLOS. In the area of jurisdiction and sea territory particularly the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous zone (TSC).103 This convention is 
still important since while UNCLOS have replaced most (but not all) of this convention not all 
signatories of this convention have signed UNCLOS, most notably the USA.104 Despite this, it 
is generally accepted that most of UNCLOS now is to be regarded as customary law.105 
2.2.1.2 UNCLOS 
UNCLOS is ‘one of the most comprehensive and complex multilateral treaties ever 
concluded’106, which both codified already existing law and expanded upon it, and created 
entirely new law.107 It is often called the ‘constitutions for the oceans’108, and codified parts of 
customary law that for many years had been disputed, such as how to decide and measure a 
coastal state’s sea territory.109  It also codified less disputed customary rules, such as innocent 
passage and transit passage, as the freedom of navigation as part of the freedom of the seas 
already were, as mentioned, generally accepted among the international community since the 
17th century.110 UNCLOS also had compulsory rules for dispute settlement, even though with 
some restraints.111 Lastly, UNCLOS ‘birthed’ three different institutions: The international 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and 
The international Seabed Authority.112 Another thing to mention that concerns jurisdiction, 
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albeit not directly related to the thesis topic, is the 1994 Agreement in the Deep Sea Bed, which 
added to the already comprehensive convention and with its modifications increased the 
number of ratifications by states, making it into the important convention it is regarded as 
today.113 
2.2.1.3 The three principles of the law of the sea 
There are three universally accepted principles in the law of the sea.114 These have been 
codified in UNCLOS, but it is of interest to examine them as both customary law and as 
codified law. 
2.2.1.3.1 The principle of freedom 
The freedom of the seas is not a complicated principle; it is essentially the freedom to use the 
seas as you wish.115 It stems from when Spain and Portugal in the 15th century tried to divide 
the seas between each other, a highly protested action.116 Instead, the seas became a place where 
state could do what they wished, with especially the freedom of navigation being helpful for 
the UK, who were free to extend its naval influence.117 In UNCLOS, this principle can be found 
throughout the convention. Regarding the freedom on the high seas specifically, article 87, 
called ‘The freedoms of the high seas’, have a non-exhaustive list of freedoms with the freedom 
of navigation, overflight, laying of cables, fishing and scientific research.118 This, together with 
article 89, invalidates any claim of jurisdiction on the high seas.119  
2.2.1.3.2 The principle of sovereignty 
The principle of sovereignty is what could be called the counterforce to the freedom of the seas, 
that instead ‘seeks to safeguard interests of coastal States’120 As a counterforce, the idea is to 
divide the sea into the high seas (without state jurisdiction) and sea territory (with state 
jurisdiction).121 The amount of what is to be considered as sea territory has been increasing 
over the years, a process called ‘creeping jurisdiction’ by scholars, as more and more territory 
falls to coastal states.122 Most of the first parts of UNCLOS deal exclusively with delimiting as 
well as right and restrictions of state’s within these limits.123 
 
113 Dixon 218 - 219. 
114 Tanaka 16. 
115 Ibid.  
116 Ibid 17. 
117 Ibid. 
118 UNCLOS article 87; David Anderson, ‘Freedoms of the High Seas in the Modern Law of the Sea’ in The 
Law of the Sea in David Freestone, Richard Barnes, David Ong (eds) (Oxford University Press 2006) chapter 
17, 329 – 330 (Henceforth ‘Anderson’). 
119 Anderson 331; UNCLOS article 89. 
120 Tanaka 18. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Stuart Kaye, ‘Freedom of Navigation in a Post 9/11 World: Security and Creeping Jurisdiction’ in David 
Freestone, Richard Barnes, David Ong (eds) The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (Oxford University 
Press 2006) chapter 18, 347 (Henceforth ‘Kaye’). 
123 UNCLOS, article 2 – 85. 
17 
 
2.2.1.3.3 The principle of the common heritage 
The principle of the common heritage is there to ‘promote the common interest of mankind as 
a whole’.124 In UNCLOS, this has taken the form protecting the Area125 and the International 
Seabed Authority.126 
2.2.2 Jurisdiction in the territorial sea 
2.2.2.1 Sovereignty 
2.2.2.1.1 A state’s territory 
A state’s territorial sea stretches outwards from a state’s baselines127 up to 12 nautical miles.128 
Both the TSC and UNCLOS recognizes a coastal state’s sovereignty in the territorial sea and 
includes the airspace above it as well as the subsoil.129 Dixon comments that the territorial sea 
has many of the same functions as land territory has, and is ‘not merely functional’130 in the 
way other areas such as the EEZ and the CS-areas are.131 The state has the right to a range of 
different actions, such as building everything from bridges, lighthouses, and artificial 
islands.132 When it comes to the nature of the territorial sea, even before codification it was 
suggested that the ‘ownership’ of this sea territory is non-optional. In 1909 with the 
Grisbådarna case133, the right to the territorial sea is said to be just that: Non-optional. The 
state have sovereignty over this territory whether it wants it or not.134 When describing a state’s 
jurisdiction over the territorial sea, Tanaka uses the term ‘territorial sovereignty’ to describe a 
state’s ownership over it, and concludes that ‘Accordingly, the costal State can exercise 
complete legislative and enforcement jurisdiction over all matters and all people on an 
exclusive manner unless international law provides otherwise.’135 (Why Tanaka claims 
complete legislative and enforcement jurisdiction whilst concluding that it does not have that 
is unclear.) Dixon however states that there is full legislative jurisdiction, but that its 
enforcement jurisdiction is severely limited, both civil and criminal.136  
2.2.2.1.2 Land and sea 
The distinction between land and sea is an important concept. The existence of a ‘land mass’ 
for a state in turn to be able to exist is paramount.137 As an example, when discussing the 
definitions of a state, Professor Sir Percy Winfield in 1927 made the statement that territorial 
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sovereignty was bound to ‘a portion of the earth’s surface’.138 The idea of a state bound to the 
earth’s surface is also expressed in the Montevideo Convention, and while not signed by many 
states, its definition and boundaries of state is almost universally accepted.139 Such a distinction 
between land and sea is not however so obvious when it comes to sovereignty. When talking 
about what the territorial sea truly is, William K. Agyebeng describes it as an ‘extension of the 
territorial land mass’, a form of ‘natural prolongation of the land subsumed under the 
superjacent waters’.140 Agyebeng argues that the reason the territorial sea hasn’t been treated 
as such is due to the modern view on territory and jurisdiction (which does not have the same 
need for strict nation borders), but that the increasing regulations and enforcement by coastal 
states due to various reasons is proof of this link.141  
2.2.3 Sovereignty in UNCLOS 
Looking at UNCLOS itself and the formulation of sovereignty over the territorial sea, article 2 
says: 
Article 2 
Legal status of the territorial sea, of the air space over the territorial sea and of its bed 
and subsoil 
1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters 
and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of 
sea, described as the territorial sea.  
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed 
and subsoil.  
3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to 
other rules of international law.142 
As can be seen in paragraph 1, UNCLOS describes the territorial sea as a form of extension of 
land territory. It needs to be noticed that while Agyebeng and article 2 both use the word 
‘extension’ when describing it, the term ‘extension’ does not carry the same exact meaning in 
UNCLOS. This is because Agyebang talks about the concept of sovereignty of land continuing 
as it hits the waterline but article 2 describes an extension of sovereignty, which does not carry 
the same broad implications. When it comes to paragraph 3, it is clear that while the article 
gives sovereignty to the coastal state, it puts several restrictions on it: Restriction in relation to 
other rules in UNCLOS, and restriction in relation to other rules in international law. 
2.2.3.1 The obligations of seafaring vessels 
Since the territorial sea is part of a state’s territory, a ship which enters said territory logically 
submits to that state’s jurisdiction. When it comes to legislative jurisdiction, it is without doubt 
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that as long as a law does not go against international law, a state is allowed to make that rule.143 
The state is also free to force its own nationals, civilian ships belonging to that state, and state 
vessels to follow those rules.144 However, when trying to enforce those rules on a vessel 
belonging to another state the coastal state is severely limited in its enforcement jurisdiction. 
For while it may have rules that ships should follow a certain regime or abide certain rules, to 
enforce those rules, the state would have to interdict such a vessel.145 
2.2.3.2 Civil and criminal limits 
Both TSC and UNCLOS has puts limits on a state’s ability to interdict commercial vessels both 
due to civil and criminal reasons.146 When it comes to the criminal jurisdiction, UNCLOS 
article 27 says that a state should not intervene unless the criminal act done by an individual is 
related to the coastal state, disturbs the coastal state, the ship asks for assistance or if it is 
‘necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances’.147 
When it comes to civil jurisdiction in UNCLOS, it says the coastal state should not act due to 
civil proceedings against the ship or any civil matter against an individual on the ship.148 Dixon 
describes both of these limits that a state is that while a state ‘legally [is] entitled to exercise 
such jurisdiction (…) it should not do so for reasons of international comity’.149 The wording 
used in both articles however, ‘should not’, does not actually express a rule that forbids it.150 
This is the result of an unwillingness of saying ‘should not’, but has by most states been 
interpreted as a general rule as forbidding it.151 
2.2.4 Ship-jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction over a ship is based on the idea of Flag-states. Unless in some way given 
enforcement jurisdiction over a ship, either through convention law, customary rules, or 
submitting to those rules by for example entering a port, the ship is under the exclusive 
enforcement jurisdiction of its flag state.152 In turn, the flag-state has to follow a certain set of 
rules, and have to investigate the matter if needed, such as if a causality would happen onboard 
or at the request of another state.153 
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2.3 The right of innocent passage 
While there might be some limits to a costal state’s enforcement jurisdiction, what truly limits 
it is foreign ships right of innocent passage.154   
2.3.1 Innocent passage in customary law 
2.3.1.1 Origins 
The right of innocent passage is part of the principle of the freedom of the seas, specifically the 
freedom of navigation.155 The idea of innocent passage is that a foreign vessel should be able 
to use a state’s sea territory as part of an ‘innocent’ journey.156 The concept of innocent passage 
can be traced as far back as the Roman empire, however the idea of transferring this concept 
of innocent passage to the sea for foreign actors might not be as old as some might assume.157 
It wasn’t until the 17th century with the arguments of Hugo Grotius, when this idea fully took 
root.158 He argued that ownership of sea territory should not result in that territory no longer 
should be able to be traversed:  
It is also certain that he, who is in Possession of any Part of the Sea, cannot lawfully 
hinder Ships that are unarmed, and give no Room to apprehend Danger, from Sailing 
there: Since such a Passage, even through another’s Country, cannot justly be hindered, 
tho’ it be commonly less necessary, and more dangerous.159  
Why should the area be prohibited to travel if the travel in a way that leaves no damages and 
is entirely inconsequential to the owner of said area?  
2.3.1.2 In modern times 
A modern version of innocent passage can perhaps first be seen in English law in the beginning 
of the 19th century. A notable case is The Twee Gebroaders 1801, where Lord Stowell stated 
that ships just passing through didn’t do any damage, and a neutral state should be able to in 
most cases pass through without asking for permission.160 The first real consideration however 
was in Regina v Keyn (1876), where the court deemed itself to not have jurisdiction over a 
foreign vessel due to the idea of innocent passage. While this lack off jurisdiction was protested 
in the English Parliament, it did also have some support.161 After this, there came many 
attempts to fully codify innocent passage, with successful codifications in both the TSC and 
UNCLOS. 162 
2.3.2 Innocent passage in UNCLOS 
Innocent passage is detailed in part II section 3 in UNCLOS and is covered by article 17 – 28. 
Article 17 states: 
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Right of innocent passage 
Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the 
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.163 
Article 18 continues with a definition of passage, stating that the ship actually needs to have 
the intention of passing through and not to enter the coastal state’s internal waters. In addition 
to that, the vessels speed has to also be acceptable.  The passage do however include ‘stopping 
and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are 
rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to 
persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress’.164 Next, article 19 defines the meaning of 
innocence: 
Article 19 
Meaning of innocent passage 
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security 
of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention 
and with other rules of international law.165  
Article 19 then continues with a list of activities that is to be considered non-innocent, 
mentioning several illicit acts which does not relate to an innocent passage, such as sabotage, 
military actions, etc.166 The list is however considered by most legal scholars to be non-
exhaustive.167 What is relevant to take note of in article 19, is that 19(2)a directly mentions the 
UN charter as part of the assessment, bringing additional treaty law into relevance.168 Article 
20 relates to underwater vessels, which are required to make their passage on the seas surface, 
or be considered non-innocent.169 Article 21 is about laws and regulations that a coastal state 
may impose on the ship despite of innocent passage, with a list of different areas a state can 
institute laws and regulations in.170 They need however to be in accordance to paragraph 21(2): 
2. ‘Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment 
of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or 
standards.’171 Breaching article 21 does not mean that a ship no longer is to be considered 
innocent, in comparison to article 19.172 Instead, one of article 21’s functions are to further 
clarify the meaning of article 19(2). With regards to ship regulations, Yang comments that 
paragraph 2 in essence makes any law or regulation regarding this obsolete, as long as the ship 
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follows state practice, which ‘basically imply those established in the conventions of the IMO, 
notably SOLAS 1974 and STCW 1978’.173 
Article 22 – 26 shall at the time not be commented on, since these are not in direct relation to 
making a ship non-innocent.174 Article 27 and 28 has already been commented on. 
2.3.3 Passage in international straits 
The usage of an international strait is part of the freedom of navigation, and as commerce on 
the sea has grown, straits have become increasingly important.175 The right of passage through 
straits between two high seas, and if vessels enjoy innocent passage in these straits, was 
answered in the Corfu Channel case (1949), a case which later codification of the right of 
transit passage heavily rely on.176 
2.3.3.1 The Corfu Channel Case 
The Corfu Channel Case resolved a conflict between The UK and Albania in 1946 and was 
decided in 1949 by the international court of justice (ICJ).177 The ICJ concluded that there was 
a right of innocent passage in international straits, that this right was non-suspendable, and that 
it included warships.178 This results in that the right of innocent passage in an international 
strait could be considered ‘stronger’ than the right of innocent passage in territorial waters.179 
2.3.3.2 UNCLOS 
The views expressed by the court in The Corfu Channel Case was adopted and codified in 
UNCLOS.180 Transit passage is codified in Part 3 of UNCLOS, with the specifics in section 
2.181 Article 37 says: 
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Scope of this section 
This section applies to straits which are used for international navigation between one 
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or 
an exclusive economic zone. 
As can be seen, and also pointed out by Tanaka, is that article 37 does not only cover high seas 
to high seas, as The Corfu Channel case did, but also between EEZ’s.182 When it comes to the 
difference between innocent passage in the territorial sea, and innocent passage in international 
straits, Tanaka lists four major differences. Firstly, that all ships have a right to passage, 
including warships. Secondly, that it includes aircrafts. Thirdly, that it can only stop due to 
‘force majeure and distress’183 in accordance to article 39, and lastly that ‘There shall be no 
suspension of transit passage’.184 The importance of transit passage and the right for other states 
to enjoy transit passage goes so far as to potentially hinder the sovereign state from enjoying 
its rights to construct bridges that could possibly hinder ships.185 This problem was  presented 
in the Great belt case (1991), where the question wasn’t whether all ships were blocked from 
passage, only if some, very large ships would be.186 
2.3.3.3 Passage in interoceanic canals 
It has to be mentioned that interoceanic canals are not part of the right of innocent passage, 
since it is not a part of the law of the sea. These canals, such as the Suez Canal which is relevant 
to this case, is man-made and part of the state’s land territory.187 
2.3.4 Security jurisdiction 
2.3.4.1 UNCLOS and the limits of innocent passage 
2.3.4.1.1 The consequences of 9/11 
The terror-attacks on the 11th of September 2001 had a massive impact on the world. It changed 
the international political landscape, and started what is generally known as ‘the war on 
terror’.188 It is been theorized that many deeds that has been motivated by the events of 9/11, 
would not have been considered ‘lawful’ would the incident never have happened.189 The 
development in international law due to the events of 9/11 has not escaped maritime law, and 
it is clear that it has had impact both on the approach of innocent passage and sea jurisdiction 
in general.190 
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2.3.4.1.2 Increasing need for security jurisdiction 
Innocent passage in article 19(2) is as mentioned, a non-exhaustive list, detailing the right of 
innocent passage as long as it is not ‘prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the 
coastal State’.191 Among other things, Rothwell and Stephens connects the terrorist attack in 
2001 with an increase of interdiction rights in the territorial sea, with states requiring further 
warning/notification before entering their territorial sea.192 Such security concerns can be seen 
as part of article 19 in UNCLOS. Even though such security might seem as a rather strict 
requirement, Professor Stuart Kaye explains that the security referred to in article 19 is a term 
that is much more extensive than it may suggest. Not only does it refer to some sort of military 
security, but can include other threats, such as environmental threat, or transmissions from the 
sea that seeks to undermine the state.193 The environmental threat is especially noteworthy, and 
is a concern that has been growing among a large number of coastal states, and that has in turn 
had an impact on those state’s requirements of passing vessels.194  
2.3.4.1.3 The potential erosion of the freedom of navigation  
While this might be a natural development due to environmental issues and the like, Kaye is 
concerned over recent development such as with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a 
main concern.195 The PSI, endorsed by a sizable amount of states, is a danger to the freedom 
of navigation according to Kaye even though it is not per se a binding treaty.196 
While such a proportion would not reach the level of support indicated by the 
International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases to indicate the 
presence of customary international law, it still represents a sizeable body which does 
not accept that the LOSC does not restrict freedom of navigation for security reasons, 
beyond the limited exception in Article 25(3) a concern over the creeping jurisdiction in 
innocent passage and the freedom of navigation in general.197 
As such, Kaye is worried that the same ‘creeping jurisdiction’ that can be seen under the 20th 
century where state’s took control of more and more sea territory, will endanger the principles 
of freedom of navigation.198 
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It is important to not confuse sovereignty and jurisdiction with each other, as the first is what 
creates the other. The modern interpretation of jurisdiction is based on the Lotus Case (1927), 
which makes a clear distinction between what is called legislative jurisdiction and enforcement 
jurisdiction. Legislative jurisdiction can be applied on everything and everywhere, but it is 
enforcement jurisdiction that stops a state from applying said legislative powers. When it 
comes to the jurisdiction in the territorial sea, it is mainly regulated by UNCLOS, which is to 
be recognized as customary law. It can be seen that even though jurisdiction in land and water 
is similar, they are of a different nature based on the idea of land and sea. Where it on land has 
no restrictions, jurisdiction on the sea carries with it certain limitations. The reason for this is 
because sea jurisdiction exists between the two opposite principles of freedom and sovereignty, 
which both vie for more power over the other. The central figure of this strife in the territorial 
sea is the right of innocent passage, a right that lets ships that are harmless to the coastal state 
pass through. Due to recent developments however, such as the events of 9/11 and increasing 
environmental concerns to name a few, the principle of the freedom of the seas have been 
slowly eroding in favour of the principle of sovereignty. 
 
3 Economic sanctions and interdiction 
This chapter deals with two concepts: Economic sanctions, and the legal use of force in a 
maritime setting. It is important to make it clear for an analysis of the Grace 1 incident the 
nature of the tool that Gibraltar used to detain the vessel, as well as its legality and acceptance 
of it in international law. It is also important to put this tool into the context of the use of force, 
a use of force aimed at trying to enforce these economic sanctions. The first two sections of the 
chapter therefore deals with economic sanctions as a tool, as well as its use and legality in 
accordance with international law. The third and largest section examines the nature of the 
action taken on the Grace 1, to then move on to the subject of force itself, and legal ways to 
use it.  
 
3.1 Economic sanctions as a tool 
3.1.1 Definition of an economic sanction 
What must first be commented on is that ‘sanction’ itself is a disputed word. An example of an 
action may often be described as a sanction in accordance to the UN Charter, but the UN 
Charter does not in fact even contain the word ‘sanction’. Instead, the word that is used to 
describe it is ‘measures’.199 The EU does also not use the word in a strict sense, and instead 
describes it as ‘restrictive measures’.200 Regardless, the word that will be used in this thesis is 
‘sanction’, since ‘measure’ can indicate other actions that is not directly related to the 
discussion. The word ‘measure’ is by nature, vague. While ‘measure’ could very well be used 
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as a synonym, it does risk indicate a broader spectrum of actions than it is meant to. When it 
comes to the term ‘economic sanction’, it is in actuality a generic term for three different kinds 
of actions that one a state can take towards another state, legal body or individual.201 These 
three actions are (1) limiting exports, (2) restricting imports and (3) disrupting finance. These 
different actions are often combined.202 An economic sanction can be done by one state, or 
together by several states. Sanction actions can be done unilateral, as in an action only taken 
by one state, bilateral, an action taken by several states, or multilateral, a multitude of states.203 
EU sanctions can therefore be considered multilateral, due to the large number of states 
involved. Sanctions based on directions from the UN Security Council (SC) are also 
multilateral, but on a different level then EU sanctions.204 This multilateral nature of the 
application is not to be confused with the sanctions in practice; two states deciding not to trade 
with a third is certainly an agreement between the two and therefore bilateral, but the third 
party has nothing to do with it.205 If a sanction can be regarded as more than an internal action, 
it is by definition unilateral unless the entity is part of it or the action is taken via the SC, which 
then becomes multilateral in both application and practice.206 
3.1.2 The purpose of economic sanctions 
Economic sanctions are a tool that is deployed for a variety of different reasons, sometimes as 
a form of punishment, other times as a tool for foreign influence, or a way to make certain 
actions by a state so expensive that it would be discouraged from taking that action.207 It can 
also be used as an offensive tool, such as the US v Cuba-sanctions in 1960, where the goal was 
to actually destabilize the government.208 Economic sanctions are often described as ‘the most 
obvious of the alternatives to military intervention’.209 The use of economic sanctions can be 
traced back to Ancient Greece, ‘including the use of blockades to cut off trade and supplies to 
an adversary through the centuries’.210 
3.1.3 Economic disruption 
As explained, there are three different kinds of actions. Restrictions in import and exports could 
be named as pure trade restrictions and are fairly easy to comprehend and can include 
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forbidding certain goods or material to be traded.211 This means that a state can be forbidden 
to trade with that country, but it does not hinder trade with another country, something that also 
often is the pitfall of unilateral sanctions by minor powers.212 Disrupting finance however can 
include the freezing of certain bank-accounts or other assets abroad, or even withhold aid.213 
 
3.2 Economic sanctions in the modern world  
3.2.1 The use of sanctions 
Today, the use of economic sanctions is standard to foreign policy and ‘economic warfare’214, 
as Matthew Happold describes some of these measures, both in a more multilateral context as 
well as unilateral.215 Its popularity is easy to understand: When a state finds themselves in a 
‘international crisis’216 they usually only have three options available. Either they take military 
action, take economic action, or they do not respond at all. When faced with only those three 
possibilities it is understandable why economic sanctions are chosen. As the established tool 
for taking economic action, to take an action is seen as better than not taking one at all, and it 
does not carry the same risks as a military action would.217 It is however not an option that 
carries no risk, despite what it may suggest Economic sanctions can often have negative effects 
on the state that imposes them. Lawmakers also seem to tend to overvalue how effective a 
specific sanction-regime will be.218 The two entities in the international community today that 
relies the most on economic sanctions are the UN and the EU.219 
3.2.2 The legality of economic sanctions 
3.2.2.1 The legality based on the UN Charter 
When discussing the legality of sanctions, it is of importance to divide sanctions into two types 
of sanctions: UN sanctions, and non-UN sanctions. UN sanctions are based on the decisions of 
the SC and is backed up by the UN Charter, article 25, 39 and 41.220 The UN Charter gives 
these sanctions legitimacy and the Council can do so by both recommendation and as a 
decision, a decision that is binding to the member states in accordance to article 25.221 This is 
seen as one of the main ways of penalizing a behaviour by a state that has not acted in 
accordance to international law, even though it is seldom used, a major factor of this being the 
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3.2.2.2 The legality of sanctions outside the scope of the UN 
3.2.2.2.1 The Lotus principle and coercion 
Daniel H. Joyner describes in his text about the legal limits of sanctions, as ‘a complex one’.223 
On the basis of the Lotus principle, a state can choose whoever it wants, or do not want to trade 
with, and it has no obligation to let its nationals trade with any other state they want to. The 
question of legality does therefore not arise in the context of the decision taken by the state, 
but rather the intention of such an action. If an action taken is meant as a form of coercion 
towards the other state, it could be argued that that action is unlawful.224 This is derived from 
principles firmly established in customary law, which makes it unlawful for another state to try 
to influence another state’s sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention. This principle can 
for example be found in the United Nations General Assembly resolution 3281.225 Article 32 
specifically states: 
Article 32 
No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of 
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the 
exercise of its sovereign rights.226 
Joyner and other scholars argue that a breach of such a general and established principle in 
international law would make the principles found in what is called ‘the law of armed conflict’ 
(jus in bello) applicable. The principles of jus in bello puts certain restrictions on actions in an 
armed conflict, and a breach of it would automatically make that action unlawful.227 
3.2.2.2.2 Economic warfare 
The reasons for Joyner’s insistence on applicability of these principles on a measure that is not 
a direct armed conflict is because of the idea of economic warfare. Attempts of coercion 
through economic means cannot reach the level of an armed attack since it technically isn’t a 
use of force, but it can potentially be as destructive as a military attack (especially since it is 
usually larger states that implement sanctions on smaller states).228 Joyner derives the definition 
of ‘economic warfare’ from the comments of Lowe and Antonios Tzanakopoulos on the subject 
matter, who made their own definition of ‘economic warfare’ due to the lack of a real one 
established in international law.229 Lowe and Tzanakopoulos remarks that it is to be 
remembered that economic warfare is often as large a part of a war as ‘normal’ warfare, and 
has existed as long as the concept of war itself has existed.230 Economic warfare can in turn be 
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split into two: (1) Economic warfare via the use of force such as blockades, and (2) non-use of 
force such as trade restrictions.231 What is truly of interest though is economic warfare during 
peacetime. Lowe and Tzanakopoulos states that, due to development in the area of conflict and 
the effects of the UN Charter, ‘economic warfare, in the form of economic coercion, is also 
[now] an alternative to—and not simply a complement of—armed conflict’.232 Economic 
warfare (during peacetime)233 can be defined as unilateral economic actions to ‘bring about a 
change in the conduct of the target’.234 This includes all kinds of action, even such things as 
withdrawing or limiting economic aid that was previously given, as long as the intent was to 
coerce the target into changing. This has been established in the Nicaragua case (1986).235 For 
the intent of change to be defined as economic warfare, there must also exist an actual pressure 
or danger of pressure on the target state, since it otherwise would be comparable to armed 
warfare.236 
3.2.2.2.3 Economic warfare and jus in bello 
Joyner asserts that the use of economic sanctions by larger states against smaller states has 
become ‘so commonplace’237 that its destructive power and the danger of allowing this 
economic warfare has resulted in many legal scholars arguing that sanctions even mandated by 
the SC in peacetime should be included in the principles of jus in bello.238 Joyner therefore 
argues that economic sanctions that are coercive in nature239 (even those endorsed by the SC) 
needs to follow the principles of jus in bello, those principles being the principles of necessity 
and proportionality, discrimination, and review.240 While this reasoning could be criticized, 
Joyner states that the application of these principles is firmly established in legal doctrine and 
customary law. Joyner derives this from several sources, most notable the United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 3281, the conclusions made by Lowe and Tzanakopoulos, and 
the analysis of W. Michael Reisman in his text: The Applicability of International Law 
Standards to United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes.241 In this text Reisman 
analyses the question if economic sanctions are to be included in the principles of armed 
conflict, and concludes that ‘Future non-retorsive uses of the economic strategy, whether by 
the international community or on a unilateral basis, should be examined prospectively in terms 
of the requirements of the law of armed conflict.’242 His solution is that any future sanction 
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regime must be designed much more carefully and specifically as to not be under these 
requirements.243 Joyner therefore in turn concludes that the legal use of sanctions is limited, 
and that ‘It is almost certain that no application of unilateral counterproliferation sanctions to 
date’244 would be considered legal in consideration of these rules.245 
3.2.2.3 Human rights violation 
Due to the nature of economic sanctions, the application of them outside an active conflict risks 
constitute one or several human rights violations, such as ‘the rights to life; health; an adequate 
standard of living (…); and freedom from hunger’.246 Since UN sanctions are obliged to still 
follow customary international law in accordance to article 1 in the UN Charter, even sanctions 
that are done at the direction of the SC is of risk of being a serious human rights violation.247 
3.2.3 Critique against economic sanctions as a whole 
While this thesis mainly deals with the legality and enforcement of sanctions rather than the 
sanctions themselves, economic sanctions as a tool are so widely criticized, that it needs to be 
mentioned. It is a tool that risks being either ineffective, or too effective, with the second option 
resulting in damage to an innocent population.248 Often the target state just finds another state 
do trade with.249 Sanctions have historically at times been effective, but not as a tool for some 
sort of ‘economic warfare’, but to pressure countries that the state already have a good relation 
with, such as close trade-partners or allies.250 Its potential destructive effects can, and have 
resulted in major humanitarian crises. A modern notable example of this is what Simmons 
describes as the ‘Iraqi apocalypse’, when the USA was the state mainly responsible for 
designing and enacting UN decided sanctions on Iraq after Iraq invaded Kuwait 1990. The 
sanctions ultimately ended up being one of the main factors of the estimated death of 500 000 
Iraqi children.251 Finally, notwithstanding the risk of being illegal under international law, the 
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3.3 Maritime actions to enforce economic sanctions 
3.3.1 Blockade and interdiction 
There are generally two accepted ways to physically hinder vessels to transport its goods to a 
target of a sanction. The first one is via blockade, and the other is via interdiction.253 
3.3.1.1 Blockade and ‘the law of blockade’  
3.3.1.1.1 Definition of blockade 
The term ‘blockade’ is one that has evolved through time. As already described, the use of a 
blockade to enforce some sort of economic sanction has been recorded as far back as ancient 
Greece.254 The more modern definition stems from the Declaration of Paris (1856) and the  
Declaration of London (1909), which lays out the basic accepted concepts of a blockade.255 
The ‘classic’ naval blockade, as Fielding describes it, is referring to a specific coastline being 
physically blocked off.256 
3.3.1.1.2 Long distance blockade  
Due to development of technology the existence of the so called ‘long distance blockade’257 
emerged during the first and second world war. The UK set up such a blockade against 
Germany in both wars, by having vessels patrol large swathes of sea.258 Such a blockade, since 
it does not follow the ‘law of blockade’, is considered unlawful.259 It can though be argued if 
a long distance blockade even can be categorized as a blockade. Heinegg specifies in his 
explanation of a blockade that it ‘by its very nature’260 has to be blocking off the affected states 
coastline in some way; if it is something done for example in another state’s territorial sea, it 
is not to be considered a blockade, simply because of the physical nature of a blockade.261 
3.3.1.1.3 Blockade v interdiction 
It is important to differentiate a blockade from a interdiction, and while there are several 
reasons, the most obvious one is that a blockade done without the support of the UN, is 
specifically mentioned in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 
article 3(c) (often referred to as the definition of aggression resolution) as an act of 
aggression.262An interdiction, while it (obviously) still can be deemed unlawful in the context 
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of international law, does not risk falling under that resolution. Such an act would if not 
supported rather be recognized as an unlawful intervention, not an act of aggression.263 The 
term ‘blockade’, or ‘naval blockade’, are also words that carries a heavier meaning to the 
public. It was theorized that the USA in the North Vietnamese mining interdiction (1972) 
avoided using any terminology that would even imply that the operation actually was a 
blockade, since that could have resulted in a more negative view of the operation.264  
3.3.1.2 Interdiction 
3.3.1.2.1 Definition of interdiction 
While presented as one thing, an interdiction operation is referring to a multitude of different 
things. The legal action stays the same, but the way to do such an action can be wildly 
different.265 It could be ‘stopping, boarding, inspecting, searching, and potentially seizing the 
cargo or the vessel’.266 It could also be setting up zones that a vessel is forbidden to enter, 
making a plane land at an airport for inspection, or regulate these vessels.267 What those 
different methods share are ‘that they have an impact on the freedom of navigation and/or 
overflight enjoyed by foreign aircraft and vessels’.268 Heinegg describes the different methods 
as having different ‘legal bases’, and that all of these ‘constitutes an infringement of the 
sovereignty of the flag state or the state of registry‘.269 The interdiction is a legal action, but 
the legality depends not on the interdiction. As a legal action that includes force, it is the use 
of force that must be legal.270  
3.3.1.2.2 Legal basis of interdiction 
3.3.1.2.2.1 UNCLOS 
As already mentioned can article 27 in UNCLOS give a state criminal enforcement jurisdiction 
on foreign vessels traveling in the territorial sea. Article 27, together with article 25 gives can 
therefore be used to interdict the vessel.271 If the crime is against the state’s own domestic law 
however, it can only interdict it in the territorial sea if the vessel was coming from the state’s 
internal waters, after having stayed in a coastal port for example. If the vessel has breached its 
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flag-state’s regulation, a flag-state can allow a ship to be interdicted (due to their right of 
enforcement jurisdiction on the ship).272 The only way to then enforce criminal jurisdiction is 
if the passage no longer is innocent in accordance to article 19.273 On the high seas, interdiction 
is only available via article 110, if a ship is engaged in piracy, slave trade, unauthorized 
broadcasting in breach of article 109, the ship is missing nationality, or the same nationality as 
the state’s (war)ship.274 Safety zones in accordance to article 60(4) may also as a reason for 
limited interdiction, to protect the artificial construction.275 Lastly, under article 98 a state can 
potentially have the right to stop a ship as to not enter a zone where a rescue operation is 
ongoing, for the safety of the one’s in need.276 
3.3.1.2.2.2 Treaties with flag state such as the SUA convention 
A flag state can via a treaty allow for interdiction. Such a treaty is, as a notable example, the 
1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA Convention).277 The SUA Convention gives the right for interdiction on the 
high seas, if the flag state is part of the convention based on article 3 of the convention.278 
Article 3 lists several different actions that are done by a person ‘unlawfully an 
intentionally’279, and which all are some form of malicious violence, damage or sabotage.280 
Both Iran and the UK are parties to the SUA convention, but due to its nature it is not applicable 
in the Grace 1 incident.281  
3.3.1.2.2.3 Master’s consent 
There is some disagreement whether the master’s consent is a legal basis for interdiction.282 
States such as the USA has interpreted it as being able to visit the ship and then afterwards ask 
the flag state if it has jurisdiction to enforce.283 However, if a state for example boards a ship 
due to its interpretation of the master’s consent as a valid legal base of interdiction, since the 
master gives approval, the question then becomes if the master’s consent is to be considered as 
an exception to flag-state jurisdiction. Heinegg, citing David G. Wilson, says that ‘Although 
the “voluntary consent of the master permits the boarding,…it does not allow the assertion of 
law enforcement authority. A consensual boarding is not, therefore, an exercise of maritime 
law enforcement jurisdiction per se.”’284 Logically with that approach, the master also has the 
right to withdraw his consent. Heinegg’s opinion is therefore consistent with the USA’s view 
on the matter, with boarding due to master’s consent being a separate action from enforcement 
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of such a ship. The master’s consent is only a tool for information if consent for enforcement 
should be requested.285 
3.3.1.2.2.4 Self-defence and countermeasures 
Heinegg mentions two additional ‘bases’ for interdiction: Collective- and individual self-
defence, and countermeasures following resolutions enacted by the SC. In regard to self-
defence, Heinegg comments that the legal ground for interdiction based on self-defence is 
‘unclear’286, other than in the risk of an attack on the state, which would be the obvious grounds 
for self-defence.287 The right of self-defence is laid out in the UN charter, article 51.288 When 
it comes to countermeasures, Heinegg expresses that there is some right to use countermeasures 
based on the decisions of the UN, but does not elaborate.289 Both are something that has to be 
examined further. 
3.3.2 The UN and the use of force  
3.3.2.1 The UN Charter  
The UN as an organization is a complicated one. It is essentially a peace project that has both 
earned recognition as well as ridicule among its own member states.290 Albeit the effectiveness 
of the organization itself can be questioned, the status of the UN charter as recognized universal 
international law cannot.291 The UN charter, written after World War II, is heavily influenced 
by the war and is thus the basis of the modern interpretation of the jus ad bellum.292 In the 
context of the legality surrounding the Grace 1 incident, it is especially the rules of use of force 
that is of interest, as well as the charters connection with innocent passage, as is listed in article 
19(2)a of UNCLOS. 
3.3.2.2 Use of force in accordance to the UN Charter 
It must be recognized that to stop a vessel that has no intention of stopping, some kind of force 
is needed. The UN Charter, article 2(4) is of special interest: ‘All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
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in international relations, with very specific exceptions to it.294 The exceptions to the ban on 
the use of force can be divided into 3 categories: (1) charter exceptions, (2) implicit charter 
exceptions and (3) customary exceptions.295 
3.3.2.3 Charter exceptions 
The first one of the charter exceptions are ‘measures against former enemy states from the 
Second World War’, based on article 53(1), 77 and 107. This exception has (for obvious 
reasons) become obsolete.296 The second one is based on article 24, which give power to the 
SC, and can via article 39 or 42 authorize a use of force.297 Article 39 states: 
Article 39 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.298  
This gives the SC the power to decide that the use of force is allowed for its member states.299 
The third and last exception is article 51, also known as the right of self-defence.300 This gives 
the states the right to both individual and collective self-defence.301  
3.3.2.4 Implicit charter exceptions 
There are two implicit charter exceptions. The first one is the ‘Uniting for peace’ resolution, 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377. This gives the power for the UN General 
Assembly to make the same recommendation as the  SC in article 39, should the council fail in 
its objective.302 The second exception is based on the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 3070 and is, as Schrijver explains it, ‘the right of National Liberation Movements 
to employ all necessary means and seek international assistance in their legitimate struggle 
against colonialism, racist regimes, or alien occupation’.303 The potential of this exception is 
unclear, and the resolution is not regarded as having any real impact at this point of time.304 
3.3.2.5 Customary exceptions 
Schrijver mentions two exceptions based on customary law, both based on the protection of 
life, but the first regarding a state’s own nationals, and the second, in protection of non-
nationals. A state has the right to use military force to rescue their own nationals from life-
threatening situations, such as hostage situations, or nationals stuck in an armed conflict in 
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another country.305 Such actions has gained recognition and acceptance amongst the 
international community, which otherwise would go against article 2(4).306 The second 
customary exception is not as widely accepted. Schrijver describes it as a right to use force in 
another state’s territory ‘In the event of flagrant and mass violations of human rights’.307 A 
notable example is Operation Allied Force by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
a military action based on this exception with the aim to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. 
Schrijver have the opinion though that without accepted opinio juris, it cannot be regarded as 
an exception. He therefore dismisses the exception as invalid. 308 Walter G. Sharp, whose paper 
reviewed the lawfulness of the operation, is on the other side of the spectrum. Sharp almost scolds 
NATO and the rest of the world for not going in with its full military might as soon as possible.309 This 
is a stark contrast to Schrijver’s opinion on the matter. It does however need to be pointed out, that it is 
clear that if you follow Sharp’s arguments that Sharp in his judgement seems to be heavily influenced 
by the incidents of the Kosovo war. The argument he makes is based on the action’s morality more than 
anything else. While this might be seen as a shortcoming, it does highlight what a non-acceptance of 
such a legal rule could result in in the future which, in itself, might be the strongest argument for an 
exception. 
3.3.3 Self-defence 
3.3.3.1 Individual, collective and countermeasures 
A state has, even without relying on article 51, a natural right to defend itself from an attack.310 
What is disputed when it comes to the question is not if the right of self-defence exist, but to 
what extent it can be applied.311 Article 51 includes two types of self-defence: Individual and 
collective.312 In the eyes of the ICJ, the collective right ‘is accessory to the right of individual 
self-defence and subject to certain additional conditions’.313 Individual self-defence is the 
state’s own right to defend itself, while collective self-defence is the right to protect another 
state.314 An alternative to collective self-defence is a countermeasure. A countermeasure is a 
debated right; the use of a countermeasure by a state in a way that does not use force, but is 
done out of ‘economic, financial or other peaceful means’315 has been accepted by the UN, but 
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a countermeasure as a tool of force has not been accepted in the same way.316 Such a 
countermeasure can be taken when a state has breached a rule of jus cogens317, and some state 
practice support that it can be done due to a breach of an erga omnes obligation318.319 The 
difference between a sanction and a countermeasure in this context is that a countermeasure is 
always a response to some form of, as Professor Natalino Ronzitti puts it, an ‘internationally 
wrongful act’320 and that the countermeasure as response often consists of the same kind of act 
against the state that has done wrong.321 While the restriction on countermeasures has been 
criticized, one of the complaints being that without it there’s no good response to attacks that 
does not rise to the level of an armed attack, it has been dismissed due to the ban on the use of 
force in accordance the article 2(4) in the UN Charter.322 
3.3.3.2 Definition of self-defence 
The most ‘classic’ form of self-defence is the one already mentioned, the defence against an 
armed attack, and it is a right that has been clearly established in international law ever since 
the Nicaragua case.323 The other type of self-defence is in case of an imminent attack, or 
‘anticipatory’ defence. Professor Claus Kreß comments that while the ICJ has refrained from 
taking an explicit decision regarding this question, the court’s view has been that an 
anticipatory defence is not line with the UN Charter, and only an actual (armed) imminent 
attack gives the right to the state to defend itself; not in the protection of ‘perceived security 
interests’.324  
3.3.3.3 Self-defence and the war against terror 
It needs to be remembered that the act of self-defence in 51 is the right to defend oneself even 
if the SC has acted or not. The endorsement of the SC can therefore allow actions of self-
defence that otherwise would not be allowed. This can especially be seen in ‘the war of terror’, 
which started after the 9/11 attacks.325 Professor Terry Gill writes that the SC when it came to 
the invasion of Afghanistan was in favour of the invasion: 
[T]he Council implicitly endorsed the (continued) exercise of (collective) self-defence 
by the US and a number of its allies in response to the 9/11 attacks. (…) At no time (…) 
did the Council indicate or decide that the exercise of self-defence was no longer 
necessary, much less order the state(s) concerned to stand down.326 
Gill remarks that this does not mean that the SC supports the act of anticipatory self-defence 
against terrorism, and that while an actor such as the USA is part of the SC and could 
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technically use its veto to stop some of the SC’s actions, that is not why the SC hasn’t acted on 
these questions. Rather, it seems that the SC has left the question to the members themselves 
if the action of self-defence is needed due to counter-terrorism.327 That means that until the day 
the SC acts on this subject, anticipatory and otherwise preventive self-defence is allowed in the 
fight against terrorism.328 
 
3.4 Summary 
Economic sanctions, or ‘measures’, as the EU describes its own economic sanctions, is a tool 
with a number of different purposes. It can be used offensively, politically, or as a form of 
economic disruption. Sanctions themselves are built upon the Lotus principle, which gives a 
state the right to decide who or who not to trade with, including the state’s subjects. While 
sanctions are said to be applied to different entities, the action itself is an internal one, and not 
external as its terminology might suggest. Why then economic sanctions can be considered 
illegal, is due to coercion. There exists a general principle of non-coercion in international law, 
both established by the UN and seen in customary law. Would an internal sanction action 
actually be part of an attempt of coercion, it can be argued that that sanction would be unlawful 
under  international law. Depending on the intent and capacity, an economic action can be seen 
as a form of economic warfare as defined by Lowe and Tzanakopoulos, and can with more 
certainty be seen as unlawful under international law, since falling under that definition can 
likely be seen trying to coerce the other state. What would then make it illegal is the principles 
of jus in bello, which is normally applied in armed warfare, but which according to scholars 
can be applied to certain actions of coercion. Economic sanctions are under large critique from 
a number of scholars, as they often are discriminating and cause suffering to an innocent 
population. When it comes to Maritime actions against vessels, they can be divided into two 
types of actions: Blockades and interdictions. Blockades are more encompassing in nature and 
used in war, while interdiction is a limited legal action that can involve a large number of 
different actions. There are also many ways in which an interdiction can be legal, but most of 
those include some form of consent from the state which has enforcement jurisdiction over it. 
The only other way would be an exception of the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter, 
but very few of those exceptions would be considered applicable in the case of an interdiction. 
The only ones that are relevant are the exceptions in the SC decisions based on article 41 and 
42 via article 39, self-defence on the basis of article 51, and the customary exception that has 
not reached opinio juris regarding intervention due to human rights violations. 
 
4 The detention of the Grace 1 
This chapter deals with the specific legal circumstances surrounding the Grace 1 incident and 
the specific questions of innocent passage that is relevant to the incident. It combines the 
findings of chapter two and three, together with new findings to paint a coherent picture of the 
 
327 Ibid 748. 
328 Ibid 751. 
39 
 
Grace 1 incident and the law surrounding it. The chapter starts with the legal basis of the 
detention from Gibraltar’s point of view, to then continue with the right of innocent passage in 
the relevant areas relating to the incident. The exploration of innocent passage starts with its 
relation with economic sanctions to then move on to enforcement jurisdiction, and finishes 
with the findings of Yang’s conclusion on the subject of the interpretation of innocent passage 
in the territorial sea. The end of the chapter is dedicated to examining and clarifying some of 
the claims made by different states during the incident, which is related to the incident but not 
necessarily to the questions of economic sanctions and innocent passage. 
 
4.1 The Grace 1 and Gibraltar 
4.1.1 EU Sanctions and Gibraltar 
4.1.1.1 Sovereignty over Gibraltar 
Gibraltar is a unique place, both due to its location and the legal dispute over it; a dispute that 
has existed since the year 1713 with the treaty of Utrecht.329 Gibraltar is of great strategic 
importance, as it gives control over the Strait of Gibraltar, the only path to the Mediterranean 
sea other than the Bosporus and the Suez Canal.330 The treaty of Utrecht is a treaty between the 
UK and Spain, which legitimized the control over Gibraltar for the UK, and Gibraltar has since 
the 19th century been a designated ‘Crown colony’ for the UK. In the 20th century, citizens of 
Gibraltar were given full British citizenship.331 Gibraltar as a crown colony has its own judicial 
system with its own supreme court, as well as its own head of government; ‘Chief minister of 
Gibraltar’.332 The UK and Spain have long been in dispute over the contents of the treaty of 
Utrecht, the UK’s sovereignty over Gibraltar and recently, dispute over its territorial waters.333 
Spain have argued ‘that Gibraltar is not legally entitled to any waters beyond the internal waters 
of its port because none were ceded in the Treaty of Utrecht’.334 Such an argument does not 
however have any legal basis, as Gibraltar’s territorial water-claims are supported both by 
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treaty law and customary international law; the result is that the sea territory is consequently to 
be seen as part of the UK’s territorial waters. 335  
4.1.1.2 The EU as an organization 
4.1.1.2.1 Supranational character 
The EU is a peculiar organization, and the prime example of a supranational organization.336 
As such, the EU is a union with exclusive and shared competence in certain matters over its 
member states, and rather than a cooperative organization, it could be described as a 
constitutional one.337 As a supranational organization, its member has transferred some of their 
power and sovereignty to the EU, in order for the EU as an organization to be able to work. 
This means that the EU’s competence is based on what competence its member states have 
given it.338 These competences are listed in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).339 
4.1.1.2.2 Acceptance of international law 
The EU is an organization that has a ‘long-standing basic principle that international treaties 
are an integral part of EU law’.340 This is reflected both in the TFEU and the Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), with the EU having several principles of 
respecting, conforming and upholding international law.341 This means that if all member states 
are parties to a convention, even though the EU is not technically bound by it, it still has to take 
the convention into consideration.342 
 
4.1.1.3 Gibraltar and the EU 
The UK joined the EU/EEC in 1973, and as a crown colony Gibraltar joined the EU as well, 
under article 227(4) in the Treaty of Rome (1957), and as such is categorized as one of the 
‘European territories for whose external relations a Member State is responsible’.343 As such a 
territory, it is part of EU’s freedom of movement, and bound to implement EU law, as well as 
the UK being responsible that Gibraltar actually does that.344 
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4.1.2 EU sanctions 
4.1.2.1 Legal basis of EU sanction 
While not directly mentioned in TFEU article 3 as an exclusive competence by the EU, 
sanctions, or ‘restrictive measures’ as the EU calls it, is based on its community competence 
based on TEU article 24 via article 21.345 Article 24 states: 
Article 24 
(ex article 11 TEU) 
1. The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall 
cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, 
including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a 
common defence.346  
Article 24 also says that all member states ‘shall refrain from any action which is contrary to 
the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international 
relations’.347 The European Council can then exclusively decide, based on suggestion from the 
European Commission, to implement restrictive measures as a common foreign policy among 
its member states.348 When it comes to the power to implement a specific restrictive measure, 
that can be found in TFEU article 215, where it says that ‘the Council may adopt restrictive 
measures under the procedure referred to in paragraph 1 against natural or legal persons and 
groups or non-State entities’.349 
4.1.2.2 EU sanctions against Syria 
4.1.2.2.1 Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 
While sanctions against Iran has been done in accordance with the UN charter, the UN has not 
put any such recommendation on Syria. The EU has instead decided to do so unilaterally.350 
The EU decided on some sanctions 2011, but the current, more extensive sanctions are from 
2012, with the Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012. Who the restrictive 
measures apply to is specified in article 35: 
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This Regulation shall apply:  
(a) within the territory of the Union, including its airspace; 
(b) on board any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State; 
(c) to any person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a 
Member State; 
(d) to any legal person, entity or body which is incorporated or constituted under the law 
of a Member State; 
(e) to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part 
within the Union.351  
The restrictive measures therefore apply, according to article 35(a), within the territory of the 
Union.352 
4.1.2.2.2 The reason for EU’s sanctions against Syria 
Neither the EU or any of its members are at war with Syria (specifically the Assad-government) 
the sanctions against them is not to be categorized as part of any military effort. Whilst it could 
be argued that some EU members allies are involved in the civil war, the reason for EU 
sanctions is not to help these allies. The answer can instead be found in the European Councils 
conclusion on Syria as of 27th of Maj 2013, which condemns the Assad-government for their 
‘continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights in Syria’.353 The 
council’s conclusion also disagrees with the Assad-governments military actions, and wants 
the conflict solved via a ‘political solution (…) based on the principles included in the Geneva 
communiqué of 30 June 2012’.354 EU want this solution to be democratic. The EU also brings 
up the increase of religious and ethnical motives for violence, which they want to stop.355 
4.1.3 Legal basis of the detention 
4.1.3.1 Legal basis of Gibraltar’s detention via EU and national law 
As per regulation, the government of Gibraltar put out a legal notice both when the Grace 1 
was detained, and one when it was released, with the second one detailing the legal basis behind 
the detention as well as the release.356 It is of some interest to examine Gibraltar’s reasoning 
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further, given in the second ship notice. The ship was designated as a ‘specified ship’ ‘by the 
Chief Minister by Notice under regulation 5’357 and detained under regulation 6(1)a of the 
Sanction regulation 2019, which is subsidiary to and decided in accordance to the Sanctions 
Act 2019. The Sanctions regulation 2019 was incidentally enacted the 3rd of July, the day before 
the detention.358 According to the Sanctions regulation 2019, such a ship ‘must be detained if 
it is in BGTW’359, and cannot be released unless the Chief minister or the court of Gibraltar 
releases it according to regulation 6(1)b.360 Such a designation by the Chief minister shall be 
made in accordance to section 25, section 30 and schedule 5 in the Sanctions Act 2019.361 A 
regulation to designate a specified ship can be done only if the vessel fulfils the requirements 
laid out in section 16 in the Sanctions Act 2019: 
16.(1) Where the Chief Minister has reasonable grounds to do so, he, with the consent of 
the Governor, may make sanctions regulations— 
(a) for a purpose within subsection (2); or 
(b) for the purposes of compliance with any international obligation.362 
In the second ship notice, it is specified that the reason for the detention was because it ‘was 
required for the purposes of complying with Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 
January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria’.363 The 
sanctions regulation was therefore made in compliance with the international obligation 
mentioned in 16(1)b. The specific article in Regulation No 36/2012 is article 14(2), which 
states that ‘No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to 
or for the benefit of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex II and IIa’.364 
The oil transported by the Grace 1 is one of such goods listed in the EU regulation and was 
therefore the target of Gibraltar’s actions.365 
4.1.3.2 Innocent passage of the Grace 1 
4.1.3.2.1 Application of UNCLOS 
Both the EU and the UK are parties to UNCLOS, while Iran, USA and Syria is not parties to 
the convention.366 The UK’s relation to the treaty is a standard one, but the EU as an 
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international organization was not at first a party that was supposed to be included in the treaty. 
Professor Esa Paasivirta comments that the EU (the EEC at the time), while only a participant 
as an observer to the UNCLOS negotiations, still managed to lobby for an ‘”EEC clause” which 
permitted the Community to become a contracting party’.367 This results in a situation where 
the EU’s members are parties to the convention separately as well as parties to the convention 
via the EU, which has led to a need for the EU and its members to cooperate with each other 
in matters relating to UNCLOS.368 EU as a party to UNCLOS has so far been accepted by the 
international community, and regarded as fully competent as an actor in proceedings related to 
UNCLOS.369 With both the UK and the EU part of UNCLOS, it is clear that the Grace 1 
potentially has the right of innocent passage through the BGTW, in accordance to UNCLOS 
article 17.  
4.1.3.2.2 Meaning of passage and traffic regulations 
Article 18 in UNCLOS becomes relevant in this instance, since an assessment whether the 
Grace 1 is to enjoy innocent passage in article 17 is dependent on if it was a passage in 
accordance to the convention in the first place. The Grace 1 went from the strait, into BGTW, 
where it seems to have stopped or anchored, or at least left the usual shipping routes due to the 
need of supplies/repairs.370 It was not done out of any distress or due to force majeure, rather 
it was a planned stop, and the vessel did not enter internal waters, or just shy of internal waters. 
The question then becomes if this irregularity was within the limits of ‘incidental to ordinary 
navigation’371 Eric Jaap Molenaar comments that in accordance to article 21 and 24 of 
UNCLOS, a state has the right to regulate maritime traffic, as long as innocent passage is not 
‘unreasonably hampered’372 by those regulations. Just because a ship has innocent passage 
through another state’s territory, does not mean that it is free to disregard any form of traffic 
regulations.373 Such regulations are necessary for vessels to follow when entering a state’s 
territorial waters, as to not endanger other ships, the environment, or the coastal state’s own 
security.374 The UK is especially concerned with the anchoring of tankers, and to not follow 
the rules subject to the (1995) Merchant shipping act when in UK’s territorial waters would 
potentially make a ships passage non-innocent.375 When a ship is ‘parked’ in the wrong place, 
the merchant shipping act would then allow the ship to be forcibly moved.376 This does not 
 
ratified/implemented it. The United States and Syria has not signed it. UNCLOS current status can be found at: 
‘United Nations Treaty Collection’ (United Nations convention on the Law of the Sea) < 
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mean that not following all traffic regulation would at an instant make the passage non-
innocent: only if the infraction was serious it would led to non-innocence. Yang however points 
out that ships that are a larger risk to the coastal state, such as nuclear-powered ship or tankers 
have a much smaller margin of error, since those pose a larger risk to the coastal state if not 
following its regulations. When it comes the Grace 1, while it has been unclear of its exact 
actions, the ship notice by the government of Gibraltar regarding its release does contain 
information on the ships journey into BGTW. It states that the ship entered the BGTW ‘by 
prior arrangement with a Gibraltar ship agent’377. This would indicate that the Grace 1 did not 
enter or act in the BGTW in a way that was against traffic regulations. 
4.1.3.2.3 The Interpretation of UNCLOS article 19 
As already stated, the list in UNCLOS article 19(2) Is considered by most scholars as non-
exhaustive. The reason for this is, as Yang explains, that 19(2) simply is a list of what can 
constitute something that is considered ‘prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the 
coastal State’.378 The list in 19(2) is in other words a way of highlighting important parts of 
how such a breach may occur. Yang shows concern that states takes the interpretation of 19(2) 
too far, without considering 19(1), as the focus always should be if a breach has been made in 
accordance to the formulation of 19(1), otherwise ‘the judgment on innocence would, in some 
cases, go far beyond the intention of the drafters’.379 However, Yang’s interpretation is not the 
only interpretation. In the US – USSR joint statement on the interpretation of innocent passage, 
this list is presented as the only way a state’s ship can lose its innocence: ‘Article 19 of the 
Convention of 1982 sets out in paragraph 2 an exhaustive list of activities that would render 
passage not innocent. A ship passing through the territorial sea that does not engage in any of 
those activities is in innocent passage.’380 This shows that the interpretation of article 19 can 
be vastly different. Yang describes that some even has the opposite view: That a breach of 
19(2) is not a breach at all, if it wasn’t done in the intent to breach 19(1).381 It all becomes quite 
difficult to discern, and even if you saw 19(2) as an exhaustive list, there is no uniform way of 
determining when any of the things listed in 19(2) has been breached, since UNCLOS does not 
contain that kind of evaluation.382 Yang does conclude that even though there are divergent 
views, it is first and foremost 19(1) that is to be breached, not 19(2), for non-innocence.383 
Yang does also comment that ‘under present international law and practice, the discretionary 
latitude of the coastal State to label passage of foreign ships as non-innocent is far-reaching’384, 
which can result in ‘inappropriate and substantial limitation to the right of innocent passage’.385 
 
power to move the ship when passage is already deemed not be innocent (due for example a breach in traffic 
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All in all, an assessment of the Grace 1’s innocence can be done both in relation to the list in 
19(2) as well as a general assessment of the wording in 19(1), but with the focus on 19(1).  
4.1.3.2.4 The requirement of causality 
Even though an action would be deemed as non-innocent, that action must have occurred in 
the territorial sea for the vessel to lose its innocence. An action taken outside the territorial sea 
cannot result in a breach of article 19.386 This requirement is spelled out in 19(2): ‘Passage of 
a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the 
coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities’.387  
4.1.4 Innocent passage and unilateral economic sanctions 
4.1.4.1 Article 19 and economic sanction 
The next thing to examine is the relation between unilateral economic sanctions and innocent 
passage, the question being what kind of breach not following an economic sanction would 
result in a vessel being considered non-innocent. The first requirement is that the breach is 
done inside the territorial sea, in accordance to article 19(2) as mentioned above.388 For 
economic sanctions, this means that it is the act itself of passing through the territorial sea that 
would be the violation that in turn would be non-innocent. When looking at the list of 19(2), 
the act of passing through with cargo in a normal way would perhaps only be able to be applied 
to 19(2)(a), if the cargo would be considered a threat to the coastal state, ‘or in any other manner 
in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations’.389 Otherwise, the only more general application of 19(1) as earlier mentioned, of 
‘prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State’390 would be applicable. 
When it comes to the use of force and economic sanctions, Fielding has expressed that 
according to the views of the Nicaragua case, the only way to interdict a vessel due to unilateral 
economic sanctions would be in self-defence in accordance to the UN Charter article 51.391 
4.1.4.2 The question of discrimination in article 24(1)(b) 
In the same way that a foreign vessel has a duty to follow certain regulations, a coastal state 
also has some duties that they need to follow. The duty that is relevant in the Grace 1 incident 
is the duty of non-discrimination, that exists in article 24(1)(b) in UNCLOS.392 It reads: ‘[T]he 
coastal State shall not (…) discriminate in form or in fact against the ships of any State or 
against ships carrying cargoes to, from or on behalf of any State’.393 There are several cases of 
discrimination that article 24(1)(b) refers to. These are according to Yang discrimination based 
on a ship’s nationality, discrimination based on what state the ship came from, what state the 
ship has as destination, or what state owns the cargo.394 Discrimination via sanctions was a 
point of discussion when drafting the convention, but it was concluded that discrimination due 
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to sanctions via the UN Charter is not applicable, since the UN Charter has precedence over 
UNCLOS.395 
4.1.5 Enforcement jurisdiction over foreign merchant ships due to non-innocence 
4.1.5.1 Asking the vessel 
Even if a passage is deemed non-innocent, that does not necessarily mean that a state 
automatically has the right to forcefully make a vessel comply with its national laws and 
regulations. The way to act expressed in the ‘Annotated Supplement to The Commander’s 
Handbook on the Law of Naval operations’, is to first inform the vessel why it doubts the 
vessels innocence, and to then give the vessel time to response.396 This is also the view 
expressed in the US-USSR joint statement.397 While this is merely the opinion of these states, 
Yang sees it as some proof of State practice, but does not conclude whether it is a prerequisite 
to non-innocence or not, pointing out that ‘coastal States are reluctant to explicitly declare the 
non-innocent passage of foreign ships’398, even though there certainly are reasons that it 
perhaps ‘should’ be state practice.399 
4.1.5.2 Enforcement rights 
If the logic follows that a state has both legislative and enforcement jurisdiction in its territorial 
waters, but that its enforcement jurisdiction is limited by certain customary rules, and the rule 
excluding foreign vessels from enforcement jurisdiction is innocent passage, then logically a 
state should be able to have enforcement jurisdiction over a vessel that is not innocent. This is 
the general consensus, and UNCLOS article 25 confirms that a state can take ‘necessary 
steps’400 to stop the non-innocent conduct.401 What ‘necessary steps’ is, Yang points out, is not 
defined, but while some countries like to avoid to apply full enforcement jurisdiction in such a 
situation, nothing in international law stops a state from applying it as long as it follows the 
rules of ‘necessity, proportionality and non-discrimination’.402 
4.1.6 Yang’s conclusion and state practice 
4.1.6.1 UNCLOS article 19 and state practice 
Although Yang agrees that under the current rules governed by UNCLOS, 19(1) can be applied 
independent of 19(2), he holds that this is not a desirable outcome. For the good of the law of 
the sea, a (merchant) vessel should only be deemed non-innocent if it has breached 19(2), or a 
multilateral agreement that extends 19(1).403 The only way for it to be this way though, is in 
the continued practice by state to follow these set of rules. State practice has so far limited the 
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use of 19(1), since states has been careful applying the rules of article 19. With enough state 
practice, Yang muses, the interpretation of article 19 will change.404 
4.1.6.2 Yang’s conclusion 
In the conclusion to Yang’s analysis he makes three statements of interest to the topic of 
innocent passage in territorial waters. The first comment of interest is that that the limits on 
jurisdiction of coastal states is in general decreasing. The coastal state has more and more to 
say about its sea territory. This newfound jurisdiction has in turn started to increasingly 
compete with the right of innocent passage.405 The second statement he makes is that UNCLOS 
does not have an adequate system of determining if a coastal state’s requirements of ships are 
obstructing the right to innocent passage, other than protection from the general principles of 
‘non-discrimination, proportionality and no abuse of right’.406 Lastly, he concludes that even 
though the coastal states have this increasing power, and with no real way of stopping them 
from limiting the right of innocent passage, the right is still being upheld. Innocent passage is 
a protected principle in international law, and the reason for that is state practice, or as Yang 
describes it: ‘The regime of innocent passage has basically been preserved in the exercise of 
coastal State jurisdiction.’407 
 
4.2 Other claims on the Grace 1 
4.2.1 The USA’s claims of seizure and the terrorist argument 
The USA made claims of seizure towards the Grace 1, due to seeing the ship being part of a 
terrorist group. Since this is an alternative motivation for detention or seizure, it is of interest 
in examining whether there is any support for this claim.   
4.2.1.1 The definition of terrorism 
There is no universal definition of terrorism, which have prompted many countries to try to 
define it themselves. The problem lies in that the view on someone’s violent actions often 
depend on the intent of that action based on political opinion. This might result in an 
organization for example both be deemed a terrorist-organization and a freedom-organization 
by different states.408 Perhaps the closest that you can get to a universal definition is the one 
reiterated time and time again by the UN General Assembly’s Declaration of ‘Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism’, the most recent iteration being the 2016 Measures to 
eliminate international terrorism 71/151: ‘Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a 
state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political 
purposes’.409 Outside the General Assembly’s declarations, the SC has defined some terrorism-
 
404 Yang 163. 
405 Ibid 262, 267 – 268. 
406 Ibid 268, footnote 1246. 
407 Yang 262. 
408 James C. Simeon, ‘The Evolving Common Law Jurisprudence Combatting the Threat of Terrorism in the 
United Kingdom, United States, and Canada’ (2019) Vol 8(1) 5 Laws MDPI, 1 – 2 (Henceforth ‘Simeon’) 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/laws8010005> accessed 23 November 2019. 
409 UN General Assembly Resolution 71/151, ’Measures to eliminate international terrorism’ paragraph 4; 
’Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism Fact Sheet No. 32’ (UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
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actions further, see SC’s resolution 1566 (2004), including killing, harming or taking hostages 
as a means of ‘intimidate[ing] a population or compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act’.410 Individual state’s own definitions are 
usually not as restrictive as the one’s expressed by the UN.411 As a relevant example is USA’s 
definition of terrorism similar to the one’s described above, but is notably wider in its 
application when it comes to what actions and circumstances constitute terrorism.412 
4.2.1.2 Confiscation/forfeiture 413 
4.2.1.2.1 American forfeiture Law 
In American law, civil- and criminal forfeiture are separated into two separate systems. In civil 
cases the seizure is done in rem, and in criminal cases it is done in personam. This means that 
the property can be seized regardless of the owner in a civil case, since it is an action against 
the property itself and not against the person, but in a criminal case the property needs to be 
tied to the one accused of the criminal act.414 After the events of 9/11, American law developed 
to better combat terrorism, and thus the Patriot Act was enacted.415 This allowed forfeiture 
cases against terrorism/terrorists to be tried either civil or criminal, and towards the assets 
involved in terrorism or owned by a terrorist, regardless if those assets were part of the crime 
(specified as ‘all assets’).416 This means that all assets can be taken, and it can be specified to 
be either in rem or in personam, depending on the situation. 
4.2.1.2.2 EU confiscation law 
As EU is a supranational organization and not a state, its directives are simply the minimum 
requirement of its members state legislation, and it is up to member states on how to handle the 
exact procedures. The freezing and confiscation due to crime can be found in Directive 
2014/42/EU, which specifically lists terrorism as part of its scope, see article 3(e).417 
4.2.1.2.3 UK forfeiture law 
Since the UK is a dualistic state, it cannot directly apply EU law but has to do so via its own 
legislation.418 UK forfeiture law for terrorism assets are based on the Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA), later amended by the Criminal Finances Act 2017. For 
property/assets to be forfeited, the forfeiture must be based on a conviction of section 15 - 18 
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of the Terrorism Act 2000.419 Section 15 to 18 lists fund raising for terrorism, use and 
possession of property/assets that is going to be used to fund terrorism, funding arrangements 
to fund terrorism and money laundering to fund terrorism.420 The amendment by the Criminal 
Finances Act however added a way other than based on a conviction of the listed crimes, with 
an exhaustive list of items that could be seized and potentially forfeited ‘if satisfied that the 
property is a terrorist asset’.421  
4.2.1.3 Seizure due to terrorism 
As mentioned in section 1.1.3.4, ‘Claims from the USA and Shurat Hadin’ the USA did not 
only seek to stop the Grace 1 from traveling to Syria, but made claims on the ship and its cargo 
as well since it was helping the IRGC, an organization USA had classified as a terrorist 
organization. When the Grace 1 was released, USA sent out a warrant for its seizure.422 The 
legal basis of the warrant was the ‘International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 
bank fraud statute, and money laundering statute, as well as separately the terrorism forfeiture 
statute’423, which are all US national laws and regulations. If the USA had been the one in 
Gibraltar’s position in relation to the Grace 1, the USA would likely have seized and forfeited 
the vessel and its cargo, on the basis of the ship being affiliated with an identified terrorist 
organization. 
4.2.2 Claims of piracy 
4.2.2.1 Piracy as jus cogens 
While not of direct relevance to the Grace 1 incident, the different claims of piracy need to be 
addressed. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, if Gibraltar’s act is deemed as an act of piracy, 
any other discussion or claim would become obsolete due to piracy’s status as jus cogens.424 
Secondly, within the Grace incident (including what happened with the Stena Impero) there 
were three separate claims of piracy or attempted piracy. Therefore, it is vital to resolve these 
claims as to not undermine the rest of the thesis. 
4.2.2.2 General definition of piracy 
Guilfoyle presents three conditions that is set in the High Seas Convention and UNCLOS. It 
needs to be: ‘(1) an act of violence, detention or depredation; (2) committed for private ends; 
(3) on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any state; and (4) by the crew or passengers 
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of a private ship or aircraft, against another vessel or persons or property aboard’.425 Even 
though some of these requirements have been questioned over the years, such as the 
requirement for it be outside the jurisdiction of any state, the fact remains that it is an act of 
piracy only if it is a private endeavour, with a need for the act of piracy to be for some kind of 
private economic benefit.426 All three actors accused are states in this instance and such private 
economic interests simply does not exist. What happened to the Grace 1 or the Stena Impero 
was not piracy. 
 
4.3 Summary 
Gibraltar’s location has a large significance, since it gives control over the Strait of Gibraltar. 
There are some who dispute Gibraltar’s status as a crown colony the UK, but at this point of 
time Gibraltar is to be recognized as part of the UK, something also recognized by the EU. The 
EU is an organization that could be described as supranational, and therefore works very 
differently from other international organizations. Its member states have willingly given some 
of its sovereignty over to it for the organization to be able to effectively function. The EU is 
also known for always trying to follow and consider international law in its decisions. The 
sanctions which Gibraltar used to interdict the Grace 1 comes from the EU, and the reason for 
those sanctions is to stop the Assad-government in Syria’s human right violations, and to bring 
political change to the region. Gibraltar’s legal reasoning behind its detention was to apply 
those EU sanctions, which was based on Gibraltar’s Sanction regulation 2019, a regulation 
enacted just the day before the detention. When it comes to the question of the Grace 1’s 
innocent passage, it is clear that UNCLOS article 17 and the articles relevant to article 17 are 
applicable. According to article 18, a vessels innocent passage must be part of a mostly 
uninterrupted passage. This passage must also, in accordance to article 21 and 24, follow 
certain traffic regulations decided by the state or it could risk becoming non-innocent, or at 
least forcibly moved. It seems that the Grace 1 did not breach any traffic regulations, based on 
the ship notice released by Gibraltar. When it comes to the interpretation of article 19 and what 
makes a vessel non-innocent, 19(2) can be seen as guidelines, but the main reason comes from 
a subjective point of view of what is to be seen as ‘prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State’.427 If a vessel is deemed non-innocent a state have full enforcement 
jurisdiction over it, as long as it follows the general principles of necessity, proportionality and 
non-discrimination in international law. The only thing that therefore protects the vessels from 
a state’s subjective decision on non-innocent is state practice, since states so far has been 
careful in their application, in order to protect the right of innocent passage. When it comes to 
the claims on the Grace 1 it is evident that the USA would have wanted to deal with the Grace 
1 in a different way and that the USA national legislation would be very effective in seizing 
the ship, since it had branded it a terrorist target. The UK legislation does not allow for the 
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same actions that USA’s does. Lastly, it is clear thar both the UK’s and Iran’s claims of piracy 
are unfounded. 
 
5 The Grace 1 and interdiction based on economic sanctions 
This chapter brings all the previous chapters together, to analyse the findings of the thesis. As 
explained in the synopsis, to best do this the chapter has been divided into two separate sections, 
each operating under its own research question. The first research question explores the legality 
of the Grace 1 incident itself and starts with Gibraltar as a state and its jurisdiction. It then 
moves on to a more general discussion surrounding innocent passage for a better understanding 
under what rules Gibraltar operates under. It then analyses the potential interdiction. Right 
before the last part of this section, the thesis makes a short comment on state practice and 
Yang’s interpretation of it, which is needed in order to accurately answer the first research 
question, an answer which is presented as the last part of this section. The second part of the 
chapter explores the second research question, and is less concerned with the incident itself, 
instead focusing on the reasons behind the incident and what consequences standard practice 
by Gibraltar could lead to. It starts with a discussion on the circumstances of the Grace 1 
incident, to then continue onto Gibraltar’s chosen tool economic sanctions. It then connects 
innocent passage and state practice in relation to economic sanctions together with further 
analysis of Yang’s conclusion. The last part before answering the second research question, 
the thesis discusses the discovered alternatives other than sanctions that Gibraltar could have 
used as tools for the potential interdiction. This part is last since it does not tie directly into the 
answer to the research question itself but is needed for the conclusion. At the end of the chapter, 
the second research question is answered. 
 
5.1 Was the detention of the Grace 1 to be considered legal under international law? 
5.1.1 Applicable law 
5.1.1.1 The status of Gibraltar 
To be able to answer the question of the legality of the detention, it must first be established 
what legal norms are applicable, as well as who is responsible for upholding them. The vessel 
was detained on the basis of a regulation under Gibraltar law, done primarily by Gibraltar, 
ordered via a designation by Gibraltar’s Chief minister. However, Gibraltar is a crown state of 
the UK, and is recognized as such. Even though the waters where the vessel was stopped is 
designated as BGTW does not stop it from being part of the UK’s claimed territory. In turn, 
Gibraltar needs to uphold relevant EU law, as a part of the EU via the UK.428 Thus, as part of 
the UK and subsequently the EU, it is clear that Gibraltar is responsible for upholding the legal 
norms of the UK and the EU.  
5.1.1.2 The acceptance of the UN and UNCLOS 
It is important to give recognition to the UN and its institutions. The UN is an organization 
that, despite the ridicule it gets, is a centrepiece of international law. The UK as part of the UN 
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Charter as well as other treaties which give recognition to the UN has an obligation to abide to 
its internationally set rules. It is the same for UNCLOS, as it is both treaty law that binds the 
UK and the EU as well as customary international law. An evaluation of the legality of the 
detention of the Grace 1 therefore needs to be made with UNCLOS as the applicable norm. 
This is only further strengthened by the EU’s principles to follow its international obligation 
and to comply with international law, a principle part of its own legislation.429 
5.1.2 Gibraltar’s jurisdiction 
5.1.2.1 Jurisdiction in accordance to UNCLOS article 2 
UNCLOS article 2 establishes two things: It establishes the sovereignty that a coastal state has 
over its sea territory, and it establishes this sovereignty as ‘subject’ to UNCLOS. What is 
interesting about the sovereignty being ‘subject’ to these regulations is that while article 2 in 
UNCLOS described a form of conditional sovereignty, what it actually ends up being, using 
the terminology of Dixon and Lowe, is sovereignty with restriction on jurisdiction. This in turn 
could perhaps be argued to be the very definition of conditional sovereignty, but that would 
imply not having control or the rights of the territorial sea based on certain conditions, and 
therefore not be a territory that is sovereign to that state. The terminology seems flawed in this 
aspect. In any case, when a foreign vessel is passing through a coastal state’s waters it has 
entered that state’s sovereign territory, and what keeps the coastal state from applying its 
national laws and regulations unhindered on the vessel is that it lacks enforcement jurisdiction, 
not sovereignty. 
5.1.2.2 Jurisdiction over the Grace 1 
When the Grace 1 made its passage through the Strait of Gibraltar, it was stopped and detained 
in BGTW. As mentioned, due to the passage Gibraltar therefore has legislative jurisdiction but 
not enforcement jurisdiction over the vessel unless the vessel is non-innocent. It could be 
argued that Gibraltar’s regulations forced the detention to happen since the ship ‘must be 
detained if it is in BGTW’430, but that regulation is part of Gibraltar’s enforcement jurisdiction, 
enforcement jurisdiction which the regulation itself has no power over. Other national 
legislation  can be enforced though, such as traffic regulations, but those could be described as 
a part of the innocent passage.431 
5.1.3 Innocent passage 
5.1.3.1 Strait passage or passage in the territorial sea 
The Grace 1 was traveling the Strait of Gibraltar, as part of an (alleged) journey to the coast of 
Syria. Since the right of innocent passage as part of a passage in an international strait is 
‘stronger’ than a passage in territorial waters, it needs to be made clear what kind of passage it 
was. It is without doubt that the Strait of Gibraltar is among the straits categorized as an 
international strait, and it is the only way for such a ship except the Suez Canal to gain access 
to the Mediterranean Sea from the rest of the seas. When the Grace 1 travelled the strait, it did 
so under the rights of UNCLOS article 37. Since the ship had travelled far it was in need of 
maintenance and/or repairs, and so it interrupted its strait passage. Although the stop was 
 
429 Section 4.1.1.2.2, ‘Acceptance of international law’. 
430 Sanctions regulation 2019, regulation 6(1)a.  
431 Section 4.1.5.2, ’Enforcement rights’. 
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needed, it was not as part of any form of emergency. Such an interruption is not one of the 
reasons a ship is allowed to interrupt its passage and still be considered part of the right of strait 
passage, which only includes ‘force majeure and distress’.432 For this reason, the Grace 1’s 
passage through BGTW was part of innocent passage detailed in article 17 in UNCLOS, not 
article 37. 
5.1.3.2 Article 18 and the definition of passage 
For the Grace 1 to enjoy innocent passage, its traversal of the territorial waters needs to be 
considered a ‘passage’ in accordance to article 18 in UNCLOS. There is no indication that the 
ship travelled at an unreasonable pace, and as already established in section 4.1.3.2.2, ‘Meaning 
of passage and traffic regulations’, it was a planned stop. The question is then if this stop was 
within the limits of ‘incidental to ordinary navigation’433 in article 18(2). The Grace 1 is a 
tanker which carries a large amount of crude oil, and as such is especially dangerous to the 
local environment should an accident or similar occur, and the UK have stricter regulations of 
tankers traveling the territorial sea. These regulations are an accepted part of the restrictions on 
innocent passage. However, no traffic regulation or similar seems to have been broken; quite 
the opposite seems to be the case, since Gibraltar themselves confirms in the specified ship 
notice that the ship entered the BGTW ‘by prior arrangement with a Gibraltar ship agent’.434 
The stop in Gibraltar territorial waters was abiding the local regulations, and the stop itself was 
not out of the ordinary and part of a normal passage. It was part of an ordinary navigation. 
5.1.3.3 Article 19 and the Grace 1’s innocence 
5.1.3.3.1 The importance of 19(2) 
Whilst some may argue that 19(2) is exhaustive, the commonly accepted view is that it is not. 
The list in 19(2) are actions not in line with innocent passage, but that does not mean that those 
are the only acts that results in non-innocence. 19(2)(l) further cement this due to its non-
specific formulation.435 19(2)(l) also showcases in some way the essence of article 19(2), 
namely an ‘activity not having a direct bearing on passage’.436 Additionally, even in the case a 
vessel would be in breach of 19(2), without proof of intent it would be hard to argue its loss of 
innocence without referencing 19(1). With that said, if the Grace 1 is deemed to have breached 
19(2) it would be a strong case for Gibraltar’s position due to the coastal state’s subjective 
interpretation being a large part of the assessment of non-innocence. In the end, Gibraltar could 
probably not be faulted for its actions in such circumstances.437 
5.1.3.3.2 Have the actions of the Grace 1 breached 19(2)? 
It shall first be said that there is no need to go through the whole list, as most actions described 
are irrelevant to the Grace 1 incident. The relevant subparagraphs are mainly ‘a’438 and ‘l’439. 
 
432 UNCLOS, article 39 paragraph 1(c). 
433 UNCLOS, article 18(2). 
434 Specified ship notice (LN. 2019/164), section 1. 
435 This is an opinion also shared by Yang (Yang 160). 
436 UNCLOS 19(2)(l). 
437 Section 4.1.3.2.3, ‘the Interpretation of UNCLOS article 19’. 
438 ‘[A]ny threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the 
coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter 
of the United Nations’ (UNCLOS article 19(2)(a)). 
439 ‘[A]ny other activity not having a direct bearing on passage’. (UNCLOS article 19(2)(l)). 
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The requirements are that it needs to be an action, or ‘activity’ as expressed in 19(2), and this 
action/activity must have been made inside BGTW. The only thing that Gibraltar has 
commented on not being in line with its laws or regulations, are the carrying of goods that are 
meant for an EU-sanctioned state, and due to the carrying of these goods, it was detained (and 
therefore presumably deemed non-innocent). Nothing else in the behaviour or actions of the 
Grace 1 seems to have triggered Gibraltar’s response. This means that the activity of carrying 
goods to a specific state is the activity that needs to be considered a breach of 19(2). When it 
comes to 19(2)(l), the answer is simple: The reason for carrying the goods was to transport it 
during a passage of BGTW. It is the opposite of the breach of 19(2)(l), the activity had a direct 
bearing on passage. 19(2)(a) is a bit more complex, but the carrying of crude oil does not 
constitute as an act of force, or threat of use of any force. When it comes to rest of the principles 
of the UN Charter the case is not as clear, but the act of carrying of such goods does not by 
itself breach any other principle of the UN Charter. If so, it is not the act itself but the reason 
for carrying it that would be the violation, and while it can be argued that some principles may 
be able to apply, such an assertion is better suited for the general rule in 19(1) than the specific 
activities presented in 19(2). 
5.1.3.4 Article 19(1) and economic sanctions 
5.1.3.4.1 The reason behind the detention 
To know what is ‘prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State’440 is 
something that could be interpreted very differently depending on the coastal state. As 
mentioned, it is not the goods that are the fault but the reason for carrying them. The reason 
presented by Gibraltar was, as quoted, ‘the detention of the Vessel was required for the 
purposes of complying with Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 
concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria’441. While motives could be 
questioned, this is the argument that has been repeatedly used and as such will be the argument 
that shall be examined. There are two different approaches to this statement: Either, the ship 
was stopped because of its destination, or it was stopped because of the EU’s economic 
sanctions targeting Syria. The first viewpoint is troubling, since to stop a neutral ship due to 
regulations regarding a specific destination is a breach of UNCLOS article 24(1)(b) as a form 
of discrimination. The same would be true if Gibraltar would argue that the reason for the 
detention was due to Iran’s involvement/ownership. Even though this line of reasoning fits the 
description of the actions taken, it holds little water. This is because it simplifies the action 
taken by Gibraltar, and whilst Gibraltar’s goal is to stop the ship from traveling to Syria, that 
is not the reasoning behind its actions: The detention was done because of EU’s restrictive 
measures/economic sanctions.442 
5.1.3.4.2 Sanctions as a means of peace, good order or security 
The usage of Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 to justify the non-innocence of the Grace 1 
in relation to article 19(1) has several problems. Firstly, neither the EU nor the UK is directly 
involved in the war in Syria. It is therefore hard to argue that there is a connection between the 
action to stop the vessel, and the safety of the UK or the rest of the EU. Secondly, the specific 
 
440 UNCLOS article 19(1). 
441 Specified ship notice (LN. 2019/164), section 2. 
442 This might seem like a purely semantic reasoning, but it is of some value to the question of discrimination. 
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sanctions themselves are not directly related to any form of security question or similar in the 
UK nor the EU; these economic sanctions seems rather to be a form of economic and political 
pressure on the Assad-government, to stop its acts of violence against the population. Thirdly, 
it is still an action to stop a neutral ship due to regulations regarding a specific destination, 
which potentially is a form of discrimination forbidden in UNCLOS 24(1)(b). That sanctions 
would potentially categorize as a form of discrimination was after all discussed when drafting 
UNCLOS, even though it was discarded since the UN charter has precedence over UNCLOS. 
On the other hand, while these three circumstances might be compelling arguments against an 
economic sanction being part of making a vessel non-innocent via 19(1), it also needs to be 
considered that such an assessment is as mentioned largely subjective. If the state considers it 
being for the peace, good order or security of the state, without an adequate way of determining 
if it is, it seems to be up to the state to make such a judgement. When it comes to the question 
of discrimination, the decision to stop all ships on their way to a specific state because of 
economic sanctions does not share the same correlation with the principle of discrimination as 
simply being barred from a certain destination would be. With an intricate tool such as 
sanctions, with its specific entities and persons and specific measures, the question of 
discrimination becomes increasingly blurred. Also, if a vessel is deemed non-innocent due the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal state, the argument that an action against that vessel 
is discriminatory would, in some sense, become obsolete. 
With such inconclusive answers, there exists a need to analyse the Grace 1 incident from the 
perspective of the action itself and the legitimization of the use of force outside of innocent 
passage.  
5.1.4  The use of force and the Grace 1 
5.1.4.1 Blockade or interdiction 
It must be determined whether the detention of the Grace 1 was part of a blockade or an 
interdiction. The actions by Gibraltar has been limited, and Syria’s coast has not, in fact, been 
blocked off by Gibraltar. It could be argued that this is the debated long-distance blockade, but 
with such specific, limited actions does not fit the description of such a blockade either. To this 
can be added that the very nature of economic sanctions, with very specific entities and very 
specific goods, etc, is a concept which is directly opposed to the idea of a blockade (to block 
everyone’s access to a specific area). It is therefore certain that what Gibraltar did is not to be 
considered an action to uphold, or an action to institute, a blockade. It is an action that can 
described as an interdiction.443 
 
443 This distinction is of great importance. Would the Grace 1 incident potentially be able to be categorized as 
the EU setting up an actual blockade against Syria, it would have been an act of aggression. This in turn, could 
be deemed as an act of war, and an act of war not done correctly can potentially be seen as a war crime. Since 
the EU for example never announced such a blockade or took any other necessary step for a blockade in 
accordance to the law of blockade, while perhaps not likely, it would be within the realms of possibility that 
individuals involved in such a decision would risk committing a war crime. Because the Grace 1 incident with 
most certainty is not to be categorized as a blockade but an interdiction, this ‘danger’ is not directly related to 
the subject matter. Would the definition however change in the future or if Gibraltar in a much higher capacity 
would start to stop ships from going to Syria, it could perhaps become a potential issue (with high emphasis on 
‘perhaps’ and ‘potential’). Thus, while not relevant in this case, it is certainly a topic for future research. 
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5.1.4.2 Interdiction due to consent 
There has been some confusion regarding The Grace 1’s flag state. It was first believed to have 
been Panama due to the ship carrying the state’s flag. Since Panama is in support of the 
economic sanctions against Syria, it could be argued that Gibraltar believed they had consent 
to board the vessel. When asked however, Panama refuted this claim, saying it had been 
removed from Panamas international registry.444 It could be argued that the Grace 1 because of 
this did not have a flag state, and could therefore be safely considered part of Gibraltar’s 
jurisdiction in that case. This is a good reason for the start of the interdiction and allows an 
investigation into the ship. Iran was although swift claiming ownership, and any form of 
prosecution would then be impossible. The vessel should have been released after Iran didn’t 
give consent to the interdiction. This is in line with the reasoning behind the legality of the 
master’s consent,445 that just because an interdiction has started, does not mean that it is allowed 
to continue, and that there’s a difference between the acts of investigation and potential 
seizure/detention. There is also no indirect consent given in relevant convention law. 
5.1.4.3 Interdiction based on the UN Charter 
5.1.4.3.1 UN and the prohibition on the use of force 
As established in section 3.3.2, ‘The UN and the use of force’, the use of force is essentially 
banned via article 2(4) in the UN Charter unless the action can be motivated by one of the few 
existing exceptions that would allow it. To interdict a vessel also entails the use of force on this 
vessel and needs to be allowed in accordance to one of these exceptions. Most of these 
exceptions can be discarded in relation to the Grace 1 incident, but some are of interest to 
analyse. The three relevant are the charter exceptions found in article 41 and 42 via article 39 
of the power of the SC, article 51 on self-defence, and the second customary exception 
mentioned by Schrijver, based on violation of human rights. 
5.1.4.3.2 The difference between UN and EU sanctions 
When a decision or recommendation is made by the SC regarding sanctions, article 41 and 42 
gives legitimacy to those decisions. Sanction actions then taken by other states in tandem with 
those decisions or recommendations, are doing so legitimately, due to the status of the UN 
Charter. While UN- and EU sanctions might operate in a similar manner, it is important to 
remember this legitimacy that EU sanctions lack. EU’s sanctions do not themselves have any 
legal importance to any other state not part of the EU. With the charter taking precedence even 
over UNCLOS, any claim that EU sanctions would have the same status as UN sanctions is 
false. EU sanctions is not a valid exception to article 2(4) in the charter, and since the UN has 
not put any sanctions on the Assad-government, use of force based solely on EU’s sanction-
regime is not permitted. 
5.1.4.3.3 Self-defence 
Next is the argument of self-defence. If the interdiction was taken as a measure of self-defence 
in article 51 of the UN Charter, that would allow it both via 2(4) in the charter and 19(1) in 
 
444 Anonymous, ‘Grace 1 no longer Panama-registered’ (Insurance Marine News, 8 July 2019)  
<https://insurancemarinenews.com/insurance-marine-news/grace-1-no-longer-panama-registered/> accessed 17 
November 2019. 
445 Section 3.3.1.2.2.3, ‘Master’s consent’. 
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UNCLOS, as that would certainly be for the ‘peace, good order or security’ of the UK. It is 
true that even if the EU and its members are not directly involved in the Syrian civil war, with 
such extensive sanctions they are at least to be considered somewhat invested in it. With other 
allied actors involved in the war, it could be argued to have been a form of collective self-
defence. At the other end, Iran’s relation with the EU is troubled, and its relation with the rest 
of the western world is decaying rapidly. An aggressive action taken by Iran could potentially 
be seen as an attack which the UK would want to defend itself against. Both arguments would 
be valid, where it not for the fact that anticipatory self-defence is not recognized as part of 
article 51 and has been dismissed by the ICJ (even if not explicitly stated).446 The shipping of 
crude oil, or the consequences of this ship arriving to Syria can in neither case be described as 
an ‘armed attack’ or an ‘imminent armed attack’. For the classic argument of self-defence, 
there is altogether no ground for Gibraltar to legally argue that the Grace 1 could be interdicted 
due to its right of self-defence on the basis of the accepted interpretation of the UN Charter by 
the ICJ.447 
5.1.4.3.4 Human rights violations 
As presented by Schrijver, there is an exception to the ban on the use force ‘(i)n the event of 
flagrant and mass violations of human rights’.448 This is the exception that NATO used when 
justifying their intervention in the Kosovo war in 1999, and while the exception has not reached 
opinio juris, has a fair amount of support.449 In the case of the Grace 1 incident, the argument 
would be that an interdiction would be justified due to the alleged human rights violations of 
the Assad-government; hindering a crude oil shipment to such an entity would then be part of 
hindering more human rights violations. There are though some problems with this approach. 
It is an exception mainly focused on intervention, which is why Schrijver specifically mentions 
the exception for the use of force in another state’s territory. That the exception (if even one 
would assume that it is truly to be regarded as an actual exception and not just an opinion of 
some states) would be applicable in a smaller scale in a non-interventional setting in the state’s 
own territory seems to be stretching the limits of this exception. When comparing it to the 
events in Kosovo, it is also hard to evaluate what is to be considered ‘flagrant and mass 
violations of human rights’.450 The ethnic cleansing in Kosovo surely could be argued to be 
that, but since even that intervention was questioned by the international community, the 
question becomes what the limit is for such a use of force to be accepted. In addition, even if a 
hypothetical limit would be reached, a use of force which is not directly part of an intervention 
into that state’s territory to stop the violations is not a use of force that plausibly could be 
motivated by the use of this exception only, especially with a principle such as the right of 
innocent passage being on the other end. 
 
446 Kreß 581. 
447 The possibility of categorizing the passage of Grace 1 as part of a terrorist action will be explored in section 
5.2.4.3, ‘The terrorism argument’. 
448 Schrijver 475. 
449 Section 3.3.2.5, ‘Customary exceptions’. 
450 Schrijver 475. 
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5.1.5 State practice 
The answer of the interpretation of innocent passage and article 19, lies in the question of state 
practice. As Yang comments, ‘interpretation is one thing and application is another’.451 The 
use of unilateral economic sanctions is not part of state practice, with most states being careful 
with the application of article 19. Furthermore, with the recognition by many states as being 
article 19(2) and not article 19(1) that should be breached for non-innocence, it is difficult to 
argue that unilateral sanctions that exists for no other reason than for economic and/or political 
pressure would be part of the usual conduct of application of article 19. Gibraltar’s use of EU’s 
economic sanction-regime is perhaps possible in view of the interpretation of 19(1) but not in 
application of it, as established by state practice. 
5.1.6 Answer to the first research question 
When considering the question of legality, especially in international law, the answer is seldom 
simple. There are many circumstances that works in Gibraltar’s favour. The limits of innocent 
passage is unclear and often up to the state itself to determine. There is also room for 
speculation regarding the use of force in relation to the legal action of interdiction which would 
have precedence over UNCLOS or, when it comes to self-defence, be in sync with it. However, 
the limits of these rules and exceptions are not boundless, and in the case of the Grace 1 incident 
those limits are reached quickly. Even though Gibraltar would claim non-innocence, there is 
nothing for Gibraltar to argue with. The same could be said for the case of self-defence, since 
it is the USA, not the EU, that has branded the IRGC as terrorists. Perhaps the most interesting 
argument would be the (non-accepted) customary exception of human rights violations, since 
hindering human right violations is one of the main contributing factors of the EU restrictive 
measures in the first place. Such violations might also be why other international actors are 
accepting EU’s economic sanctions, not because of the legality behind them but because of 
what they aim to do. Interdiction based on that is certainly above what the (non-accepted) 
exception is meant for and could not at the moment be considered legal, but it is nevertheless 
a valid argument. The problem with this line of reasoning is that this is not what Gibraltar and 
its Chief minister claimed. Gibraltar chose to not argue in the ways of an interdiction. They did 
not make any extrajudicial claims, nor did they claim to be using or interpreting any principle 
from the UN charter or its exceptions, or even disputed jus cogens. What Gibraltar and the 
chief minister did was claiming enforcement jurisdiction. It claimed enforcement jurisdiction, 
because the vessel was in their territorial waters. This leaves two options: Either Gibraltar and 
subsequently the UK now consider EU law to be above or on the same level as international 
law, UNCLOS and the UN Charter. This answer is unsatisfactory, both due to the principles of 
the EU, and because of the Chief minister’s statement that their action was a showing of how 
‘committed to the rules based, international legal order’452 Gibraltar were by doing this.453 The 
more likely option is the second one: That Gibraltar claims that the ship had lost its innocence, 
a claim that it lacks support for due to state practice. 
 
 
451 Yang 163. 
452 Chief Minister’s statement. 
453 Section 4.1.1.3, ‘Gibraltar and the EU’. 
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5.2 If Gibraltar’s conduct became standard practice, how would it affect the right of 
innocent passage and what consequence could that have?  
5.2.1 The circumstances of Gibraltar’s conduct 
5.2.1.1 The Difference between the Grace 1 and the Stena Impero 
5.2.1.1.1 Iran’s detention of the Stena Impero 
The difference between the conduct of Gibraltar and Iran, even though they both detained 
tankers that were registered in the other state, is substantial. Iran’s detention was (presumably) 
done as a form of leverage, or even countermeasure, in reaction to Gibraltar’s detention. Iran’s 
action was also taken in Oman territory, presumably while enjoying transit passage. This makes 
Iran’s actions more severe than Gibraltar’s. This is also what makes the detention of the Stena 
Impero of little interest to the legal discussion of innocent passage as well as state practice; if 
a state such as Iran acts in a way that is clearly unlawful and goes against established customary 
law with a case as important as The Corfu Channel case, the legal impact is small, if not non-
existent. 
5.2.1.1.2 Countermeasure 
The one thing that is of some interest is the question if what Iran did is to be recognized as an 
accepted countermeasure to Gibraltar’s detention. With the legality of Gibraltar’s detention 
being under dispute in the international community, it is not immediate recognizable as a 
countermeasure since it needs to have been in response to an ‘internationally wrongful act’.454 
As concluded in the answer to the first research question of this thesis, Gibraltar’s action can 
very well be regarded as an illegal act, albeit it is difficult to discern if Gibraltar’s action were 
serious enough to validate a countermeasure. However, due to the clear use of illegal force 
breaching the UN Charter 2(4), this potential countermeasure was against international law. 
5.2.1.1.3 Risk to the shipping industry 
One of the more curios observations surrounding the Grace 1 incident is that it was not 
Gibraltar’s actions that worried the shipping industry, but Iran’s. It is the situation in the Strait 
of Hormuz that has analysts worried, not the Strait of Gibraltar. This can be attributed to a 
number of different things. To start with is that Gibraltar’s action was a detriment to the Assad-
government; an entity with comparably a small amount of economic power. Another relevant 
circumstance is that the Strait of Hormuz already was under some stress after other incidents. 
It can also be attributed to the unlawfulness of the detention of the Stena Impero being more 
obvious than what happened to the Grace 1. Yet, what truly sets these actions apart are the 
state’s themselves. The UK, as well as the EU, carries considerably larger respect in the 
international community, both as accepted and respected actors in the world, and especially in 
regard to maritime law. The international community recognizes the intent of the detention (an 
intent a large part of the international community endorses, or at least accepts), to not give any 
resources to the Assad-government, and the shipping industry sees no danger in Gibraltar’s 
conduct which was done in a seemingly legal manner. This behaviour by Gibraltar continued 
throughout the process, shown by the court’s release after it got a confirmation that Iran 
wouldn’t ship the crude oil to Syria. The UK is respected, the action was limited, and the cause 
was in the view of a large part of the international community, admirable. It is understandable 
 
454 Ronzitti 11. 
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that the industry did not see Gibraltar’s actions as a danger to shipping, but that Iran’s actions 
were seen as that. 
5.2.1.2 The reason behind Gibraltar’s interdiction 
5.2.1.2.1 Legal duty 
If asked, Gibraltar would perhaps claim that they had a legal duty to interdict the Grace 1 based 
on Gibraltar’s Sanction regulation 2019. Such a claim would however be dishonest, since it is 
nearly indisputable that Gibraltar’s Sanction Regulation 2019 was drafted specifically to 
interdict the Grace 1. What has also become apparent in this discussion is that legislation based 
on national regulation have no merit in giving a coastal state enforcement jurisdiction over a 
vessel; there was never a legal duty for Gibraltar to interdict the ship. 
5.2.1.2.2 The USA’s involvement 
The Spanish foreign minister claimed that the action was taken in accordance to the direction 
of the USA, an allegation which Gibraltar has disputed. To the defence of this argument, it can 
be said that one of the main things that makes the Grace 1 incident so notable is due to the 
uncharacteristic behaviour of the EU and use of EU sanctions. Would the same incident 
happened in territorial waters controlled by the USA, the legal question wouldn’t have been of 
such a large interest.455 Although, even if the incident was orchestrated by the USA, a claim 
that can only be left to speculation, it was not conducted in a way that was in the interest of the 
USA. The ship was detained and tried on the basis of EU economic sanctions and released on 
the basis of Iran promising to adhere to those economic sanctions. The USA did also not 
manage to hinder the ship from being released, the release going directly against the USA’s 
interests and wishes. This is not proof that the claims of the Spanish foreign minister is 
unfounded, it does show though that even if the Grace 1 was interdicted on the direction of the 
USA, the USA’s eventual involvement in that case had very little impact on both the legal 
reason for the interdiction, the process itself and the decision of the court. It could reasonably 
be disregarded as simply a recommendation to its ally to interdict a vessel that was acting 
against both of their international interests. In any case, the EU must in the end stand for its 
own actions, regardless of possible underlying reasons for them. 
5.2.1.2.3 Iran as an adversary 
Another reason that would explain the reason behind the interdiction, would be if the EU took 
the action due to Iran being seen as an adversary. The action would then have been taken not 
because of its destination, but because of Iran being the owner of the cargo. This claim has 
some merit looking at the increasing tensions between Iran and the west, but in the light of the 
Grace 1 incident it is a claim that has minimal support. All of Gibraltar’s reasons and arguments 
are directed at Syria and EU’s sanction regime against the Assad-government. The tensions 
between the two entities perhaps made the decision to interdict the Grace 1 an easier decision 
to make due to the previous behaviour of Iran in the Strait of Hormuz as well as its relatively 
non-favourable status amongst the international community, but that was not the main reason 
for the interdiction itself. 
 
455 As Carl Bildt stated: ‘EU as a principle doesn’t impose its sanctions on others. That’s what the US does’ 
(David Uren, ‘Sanctions: the new economic battlefield’ (The Strategist, 6 august 2019) 
<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/sanctions-the-new-economic-battlefield/> Accessed 19 November 2019). 
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5.2.1.2.4 Enforcement of sanctions and human rights violations 
Even though other factors such as the relation with Iran and USA might have had an impact on 
why the decision was taken, the core reason comes back to wanting to hinder any form of 
military aid to the Assad-government. Denying the Assad-government its aid from Iran stops 
it from enacting future (alleged) human rights violations as well as forcing it to accept the EU’s 
demands. That the EU had support from the USA and that Iran was a safe target certainly 
influenced the decision; but neither were the main reason behind it.456 
5.2.2 Economic Sanctions as a tool 
5.2.2.1 The legal nature of economic sanctions 
5.2.2.1.1 Sanctions based on the UN charter 
Before addressing EU’s sanctions, or ‘restrictive measures’ against the Assad-government, the 
legal nature of such sanctions needs to be commented on. As already discussed in section 
5.1.4.3.2, ‘The difference between UN and EU sanctions’, there needs to be established a clear 
line between sanctions based on the UN Charter and sanctions that act outside the limits set by 
the UN Charter and the SC: Those economic sanctions have precedence over most established 
international law. It is hence unilateral (economic) sanctions that are of interest when 
discussing the legality of them. 
5.2.2.1.2 The legality of a state’s unilateral economic sanctions 
5.2.2.1.2.1 A states sovereignty 
When acknowledging a state’s sovereignty and the principles of the Lotus case, it has to be 
acknowledged that a state can trade, or not trade, with whoever it wants to. As Joyner 
formulates it:  
[I]n the absence of positive legal obligations to the contrary, it is certainly correct that a 
State has the legal discretion to choose with which other States it pleases to have, and to 
allow the legal and natural persons subject to its jurisdiction to have, economic/financial 
dealings.457 
At face value, an economic sanction could be regarded as an internal decision by the state, even 
though the actions are meant to have an effect externally. When questioning the legality of an 
economic sanction, it is not the state’s own sovereignty that is being questioned, but rather 
attempts by that state to influence another state’s sovereignty through the first state’s sovereign 
actions, or ‘coercion’, as it is called. 
5.2.2.1.2.2 Coercion as jus in bello 
As established by Reisman, together with the findings of Joyner, for economic sanctions to be 
examined in the context of the principles of jus in bello is a legal consequence of the potential 
results these sanctions could have. Economic coercion, especially in the modern setting, cannot 
be separated from the concept of a conflict between states, even in peacetime.458  
 
456 It can as well have been seen as an opportunity to make a statement, in the context of Iran’s increasing hostilities 
and thus hitting two birds with one stone, but that reason is purely speculative. 
457 Joyner 193. 
458 As commented in section 1.2.4 ‘Scope’, it is not within the scope of this thesis to question the findings on the 
legal area of the law of conflict. Such an analysis would potentially require a separate thesis. Additionally, there 
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5.2.2.1.2.3 The question of intent and effect 
It could be argued that the legality of sanctions from this point of view stems from their intent; 
the intent to coerce another state. Coercion would then, as Joyner explains, lead to a situation 
where that sanction is of a similar value to an actual attack on that state, especially since the 
effects of those sanctions could be just as destructive as a use of force by the state. The 
argument against this is that just because there exists intent does not automatically result in a 
coercion, which subsequently is the action that would be equal to an armed attack. That raises 
the question of the relation between the idea of intent and effect in this situation. Joyner’s logic 
is that economic sanctions can be equal to an attack, due to their potential destructive capability. 
Since larger states are the one’s often implementing said sanctions, that has shown to be true. 
If one would assume that a certain action is to be of equal value as an armed attack against a 
state, one would also have to assume that the intent, or ‘attempt’ of such an action should be 
regarded in the same light as an attempted attack. An attempted attack is without a doubt to be 
part of the law of conflict: Just because an attack fails does not mean that the attack wasn’t 
unlawful. What must be remembered in this case however is that while economic sanctions 
have the possibility of inflicting such damage, it is still ultimately an internal decision which 
originates from the state’s sovereignty. If a smaller state would not wish to trade with a larger 
state due to that larger state’s political or religious beliefs, would then that be seen as an attempt 
of coercion and automatically be disqualified, even though the larger state wasn’t harmed by 
the decision in any major way? Such logic would potentially disqualify any decision not 
directly related to free trade between states. This highlights the trouble of equating economic 
sanctions and the use of force and shows the need for a real legal definition for ‘Economic 
warfare’, such as the one as presented by Lowe and Tzanakopoulos. Joyner argues based on 
coercive economic sanctions with ‘economic warfare’ as an argument, but should have done 
so on the basis of the definition of economic warfare by Lowe and Tzanakopoulos. This does 
not invalidate Joyner’s argument, since the definition of economic warfare as defined by Lowe 
and Tzanakopoulos is in essence what Joyner is referring to when discussing coercive 
economic sanctions; it could even be argued being what a coercive economic sanction is, since 
a claim of intent can be viewed to include a capability for it. That this is Joyner’s viewpoint 
becomes especially obvious with the focus on the premise being destruction due to larger states 
putting pressure on smaller states. Even so, without using the definition of ‘economic warfare’ 
which makes the distinction of needing both intent and effect (or ‘pressure’ as Lowe and 
Tzanakopoulos calls it), the argument for the application of the principles of  jus in bello is 
undermined by the Lotus principle in a way that it otherwise wouldn’t have been. To therefore 
effectively argue that economic sanctions should be applied in the perspective of the rules of 
jus in bello, there needs to exist both intent, and effect or risk of effect; in other words, to be a 
form of economic warfare as defined by Lowe and Tzanakopoulos. 
5.2.2.2 Economic warfare and the principles of jus in bello  
5.2.2.2.1 General application 
With the identified application of the principles of necessity and proportionality, 
discrimination, and review on economic sanctions, there exists some need to comment on them 
 
has been no reason at this moment to question the findings of Joyner, Reisman and Lowe and Tzanakopoulos, as 
they have operated within the confines of established international law. 
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in relation to economic sanction. It is clear that all three principles would limit the application 
of sanctions: The Principles of necessity and proportionality puts a cap on an otherwise 
sovereign decision based on the need for such a sanction. The principle of review would also 
put greater emphasis on monitoring the sanctions direct effect, and not just the effect it has on 
their politically or economically motivated goals. The principle of discrimination however is 
the largest hurdle. Economic sanctions applied by a larger entity is by nature discriminatory; 
especially more broad sanctions that directly or indirectly would include an otherwise innocent 
population as a target. Joyner’s conclusion on the illegality of most modern sanctions is in this 
light the obvious outcome. 
5.2.2.2.2 The EU’s sanctions against Syria 
EU’s sanctions are not justified by the UN, but are sanctions applied unilaterally. The sanctions 
are extensive, as seen by the EU’s own list.459 They are without a doubt to be defined as broad, 
and contains a large number of sectors, including sectors such as the industrial sector, energy 
sector and financial sector. The sanctions also include specific attempts of counter-
proliferation. When it comes to the intent of the sanctions, the European Council is clear in 
their formulation: They want several political changes, the conduct of the Assad-government 
inside its borders to change, democratic change based on a proposed solution and some 
religious and ethnical conducts concerning violence to stop. With such strong condemnation it 
is also clear that this is the EU’s option to an armed action. The sanctions can therefore be 
classified as ‘economic warfare’ as Lowe and Tzanakopoulos defines it. Outside that definition, 
Joyner’s and Reisman’s ideas of coercion are also applicable in this instance. The principles in 
jus in bello is therefore to be applicable to EU’s sanctions. With that said, it is difficult to judge 
the necessity and proportionality of such sanctions. To do so an in-depth investigation and 
analysis of the Syrian civil war’s political and humanitarian consequences would be needed, 
that were in tandem with the principles of jus in bello in the perspective of economic warfare. 
What is certain though, is that the sanctions on Syria is discriminatory and with most 
probability lacks the requirements of the principle of review, since that would require the 
sanctions to be applied in accordance to the principles of jus in bello in the first place. The 
sanctions are not designed within the standards that Reisman concludes that economic 
sanctions of this kind needs to be to be considered lawful; sanctions that are more precise and 
specific, with goals and combined with ‘rigorously contextual and honest assessments of the 
collateral damage’460 the sanctions will have. 
5.2.2.3 Acceptance of economic sanctions 
The use of economic sanctions in the modern world seems to be increasing. It is a well-known, 
almost ‘popular’ measure, deployed by a number of different states for different purposes. 
Despite its possible legal and (perhaps more concerning) moral implications, as well as 
discriminatory nature, it is still a widely used tool. There are of course a multitude of reasons 
for this all depending on specific circumstances, but at the heart of the question lies a singular 
 
459 ‘Restrictive measures against Syria’ (EU Sanctions Map, 11 September 2019) 
<https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main/details/32/?checked=&search=%7B%22value%22:%22syria%22,%22se
archType%22:%7B%22id%22:1,%22title%22:%22regimes,%20persons,%20entities%22%7D%7D> accessed 9  
December 2019. 
460 Reisman 141. 
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answer: It is better than no action at all. As perhaps best summarized by former diplomat, (now) 
Lord Renwick: ‘A decision to impose sanctions may be taken less on its intrinsic merits than 
because of its attractions in relation to the alternatives.’461 Faced with the alternative of no 
action at all or military action, the alternative of economic action looks all the more alluring. 
Does this mean that economic sanctions are to be regarded as accepted state practice? Not 
necessarily, as widespread use does not always indicate acceptance. What the economic 
sanctions against the Assad-government shows is that a large part of the acceptance of 
economic sanctions come from the intention of those sanctions. There are few states that are in 
support of the actions of the Assad-government and its alleged human rights violations. This, 
combined with the status of entities such as the EU and/or the UK, both carrying respect and 
influence in the international community, it is easy to see why the interdiction would be 
accepted. Sanctions against an entity such as the Assad-government who has had UN 
investigation of war-crimes towards it is not a side many states would take. This acceptance is 
not a dismissal of the argument that the sanctions are most likely to be considered unlawful, 
and some states such as Russia which is in support of the Assad-government are quite obviously 
not in support of interdicting a vessel with supplies to Syria based on the EU’s economic 
sanctions. What it does show however is the increasing acceptance of economic sanctions as a 
tool, as well as an accepted development of that tool to hinder other states access to the target 
state. With increased use and continued acceptance, it might develop enough to be considered 
state practice in the future.  
5.2.3 Innocent passage and state practice 
5.2.3.1 The interpretation of innocent passage 
5.2.3.1.1 UNCLOS and innocent passage 
It could be suggested that the success of UNCLOS is also the reason for lack of delimitation 
found in rules such as when it comes to innocent passage: The more inclusive a treaty seeks to 
be, the less specific it has the capacity to be. That does not mean that the right of innocent 
passage is not represented in UNCLOS, but it does mean that the answer can’t simply be 
derived from the articles of innocent passage without context. While 19(2) presents guidelines 
that some states see as de facto rules, and even if a scholar such as Yang has the opinion that 
this is how it ‘should be’ interpreted for the protection of  the right of innocent passage and the 
freedom of the seas in general, that is not how it actually ‘is’ interpreted.  
5.2.3.1.2 Customary law 
Some answers can perhaps be found when looking back at how customary law has developed 
and the recognition of innocent passage in the freedom of navigation. It is to be remembered 
though that this incarnation of innocent passage is relatively new, and as part of the freedom 
of navigation which is part of the freedom of the seas, is in constant battle with the principle of 
sovereignty.462 As such, and with UNCLOS being an accepted codification of innocent 
passage, an interpretation based on UNCLOS would not meet resistance from customary law, 
as it in essence is customary law. 
 
461 Renwick 1. 
462 Section 2.2.1.3, ‘The three principles of the law of the sea’. 
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5.2.3.2 Transit passage and passage in territorial waters 
5.2.3.2.1 The difference between territorial passage and strait passage 
Even though the subject matter is about innocent passage in the territorial sea, the right to 
transit passage between the high seas and/or EEZ’s needs to be commented on in this context. 
Would the interdiction have been part of transit passage rather than passage through territorial 
waters, the answer of its legality as part of UNCLOS and customary law would have been 
different. International straits enjoy better protection and a ‘stronger’ right of innocent passage 
than the territorial sea has, and even though the interdiction in this thesis still was deemed as 
unlawful, the legality of the situation would not be as precarious.463 The Corfu Channel case 
is also prominent case law which is accepted customary law, and shows how important transit 
passage in international straits are. 
5.2.3.2.2 Transit passage and the Grace 1 incident 
Even if the Grace 1 had enjoyed strait passage, it is doubtful if Gibraltar’s actions would have  
been different. The action was after all not done in protection of the EU or the UK, but as 
Gibraltar’s Chief minister himself formulated it: ‘Gibraltar can be proud of the role it has 
discharged in guarding the entrance to the Mediterranean.’464 It is also doubtful if the reaction 
from the international community would have been different, since the focus has not been on 
innocent passage, but rather the enforcement of economic sanctions on a neutral state. The 
hypothetical scenario of the Grace 1 enjoying transit passage is not of importance to the 
incident itself, but it does carry some importance for the larger picture. It also suggests that if 
Gibraltar’s conduct affects innocent passage in territorial waters, it could also affect the right 
of transit passage. 
5.2.3.3 Yang’s conclusion on the right of innocent passage in territorial waters 
As already mentioned, Yang makes three statements of interest to the topic of innocent passage 
in territorial waters: The jurisdiction of coastal states are increasing, UNCLOS has no adequate 
system of determining if a state’s requirements are obstructing innocent passage, and the only 
thing protecting the right of innocent passage is state practice.465 
5.2.3.3.1 Increasing jurisdiction 
That coastal state’s jurisdiction is increasing is not because of a single factor, but rather a 
combination of many. Environmental concerns have led to that coastal state’s simply can’t let 
any ship cross its waters without fulfilling their environmental requirements, as the passage not 
adhering to these rules could potentially harm the coastal state. It is also a question of increased 
traffic, as traffic control becomes more and more necessary. The largest increase in jurisdiction 
has although probably originated from the need of security jurisdiction. This increase, as Kaye 
has presented, is not an isolated incident and can be tracked to the events of 9/11. It has had a 
significant impact in other areas of the law as well, most notably concerning the action of self-
defence.466 When it comes to the question of interdiction, Rothwell and Stephens confirmed 
that increased interdiction could be traced to the events of 9/11.467 Whilst security jurisdiction 
 
463 Section 5.1.6, ‘Answer to the first research question’. 
464 Chief minister’s statement. 
465 Section 4.1.6.2, ‘Yang’s conclusion’. 
466 Section 3.3.3.3, ’Self-defence and the war against terror’. 
467 Section 2.3.4.1.2, ‘Increasing need for security jurisdiction’. 
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is not directly correlated to the issue of economic sanctions and innocent passage, the Grace 1 
incident could be seen as part of the ‘creeping jurisdiction’ which is undermining the freedom 
of navigation. Without the already existing development in this area, it is likely that the 
interdiction would have been a larger issue. It also increases the likelihood of that the conduct 
of the Grace 1 becomes state practice. 
5.2.3.3.2 Obstruction of innocent passage 
As Yang noted, there is no real test to whether a state’s restrictions are to count as obstruction 
other than general principles in international law, and even in the light of these general 
principles it is deceptively difficult to discern what conduct would go against it. There is 
although the question of discrimination, which as earlier commented is a specific concern for 
such an interdiction.468 This is especially true if it would become standard practice. Without 
relating it to an immediate security concern or any form of danger to the coastal state, a standard 
practice of this conduct built on a sanction-regime could be regarded as the very definition of 
the discrimination found in UNCLOS 24 (1)(b).  
5.2.3.3.3 State Practice 
The third, and arguably the most important conclusion Yang makes about the right of innocent 
passage in the territorial sea, is that the subjective interpretation of what makes a passage non-
innocent is not being limited not by treaty law, but by state practice. Coastal states have a 
reason to keep the right of innocent passage intact, and as such are careful in their assessment 
of any breach. Even when regulations are not followed, enforcing national jurisdiction on the 
ship is going a step further. An encroachment of the right of innocent passage would lead to 
the coastal states themselves having to deal with the consequences of their own actions and 
potential effect to their own economy and shipping industry. 
5.2.4 The alternative 
In the question regarding the legality of Gibraltar’s conducts and the potential consequences of 
such conduct, it is of importance to determine if it was the only recourse other than inaction. 
Furthermore, to dismiss or endorse an action based on its lawfulness and its eventual outcome 
is of little interest unless evaluated adjacent to a viable alternative. What will be discussed next 
is therefore if there was another way to interdict the Grace 1, that would in fact have been 
considered legal under international law.   
5.2.4.1 Accepted actions 
With the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter there are only a limited number of ways an 
interdiction action can be taken and still be lawful under international law. It would be for the 
vessel to lose innocence and the state thereby gain enforcement jurisdiction (and even then the 
action has to be proportionate), or it would be an action that would be in accordance to the UN 
Charter and have precedence over the rules in UNCLOS. In addition to the loss of innocence 
through ‘normal’ means, there have been two exceptions to the UN Charter that has been of 
interest: The customary exception based on stopping human rights violations, and anticipatory 
self-defence from terrorism. 
 
468 Section 5.1.3.4.2, ‘Sanctions as a means of peace, good order or security’. 
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5.2.4.2 Protection of human rights 
As already discussed, the customary exception regarding the protection of human rights is an 
exception that can both be questioned in regard to its applicability in these specific 
circumstances, as well as validity of the exception itself.469 Since it has already been examined 
in detail, no further comment will be made of its nature or applicability. Despite its dismissal 
surrounding the question of the legality of the Grace 1 incident the exception is although 
nevertheless still worth mentioning. The reason for this is because of the close relation the 
exception has with the reason behind Gibraltar’s interdiction. The thesis has concluded that the 
customary exception regarding human rights was not the legal argument that Gibraltar used, 
and with little supporting such an argument it could not be used to justify Gibraltar’s actions. 
If Gibraltar would however have argued from the standpoint of this exception and supported 
its interdiction not directly on EU’s economic sanctions, but rather enacted the sanctions 
unilaterally on the basis of the UN inspectors reports on Syria and from secretary-General Ban-
Ki-moon’s statement accusing the Assad-government of war crimes, an entirely different 
argument could be made. Then Gibraltar’s actions would have been made in order to protect 
the UN’s interests. That line of argumentation could have garnered additional support from the 
international community. This additional support would not have made the action legal, but it 
would have been more in line with UN law and would not have risked implicating the right of 
innocent passage, as well as giving the customary exception further recognition. This argument 
though has several problems, not including the complications already mentioned earlier in the 
thesis. To take such an action could be seen as an attempt to circumvent the SC, and decide on 
an action that would normally be done at the direction of the SC. It would also be an action 
heavily motivated by the intent of the action and its interpretation subjective, reliant on the 
assessment of singular entities instead of a collective such as the SC. All in all, the 
consequences of relying on such an argument seems to outweigh the consequences of 
Gibraltar’s original actions. 
5.2.4.3 The terrorism argument 
5.2.4.3.1 Anticipatory self-defence against terrorism 
The other viable exception could be called ‘the terrorism argument’, and it is the idea that 
anticipatory self-defence is allowed if the target of a military action can be categorized as 
terrorists. The endorsement by the SC of such anticipatory self-defence has given states a broad 
exception to the use of force as long as the use of force is against terrorists. It could be argued 
that the exception only extends to actions related to the events of 9/11; however, in unison with 
the view presented by Gill, without an action by the council to express that they do not longer 
support this kind of preventive or anticipatory self-defence such use of force will continue to 
be seen as a legal exception to the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter 2(4).470 With the 
definition of what a terrorist entity is being fairly subjective, as long as it could be said to be 
within what the UN General Assembly have defined it as, categorizing certain entities as 
terrorist organizations is acceptable. 
 
469 Section 5.1.4.3.4, ‘Human rights violations’. 
470 Gill 748 – 751. 
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5.2.4.3.2 The method of the USA 
The reason the terrorism argument is particularly relevant in these circumstances is because 
this is the exact method the USA used to motivate their conduct toward the Grace 1. By defining 
the IRGC as a terrorist organization, it has gained access to a legal argument for interdiction, 
an argument that does not only have precedence over UNCLOS but is in accordance with it. 
By using the argument, the ship would lose its innocence both due to the specific principle laid 
out in 19(2)a and the general rule in 19(1). By relying on an entirely different set of rules, the 
terrorist argument does not risk changing or eroding the right of innocent passage. 
5.2.4.3.3 Categorizing of terrorists 
To categorize certain entities and/or persons as terrorists do have its limits. To do so against 
Iran for example would not be feasible, especially for the EU and the UK, both due to the size 
of Iran and its recognition by the international community. There are also more practical 
concerns. Since Iran has such a strong position at the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with its share 
in the oil-industry, too extreme an action would provoke Iran and endanger the interests the EU 
and the UK have in that area. Iran however, by not wanting to take the blame for its actions, 
has outsourced parts of the state. IRGC is claimed to be a separate entity in support of Iran 
(even though it is unofficially recognized as part of the state of Iran). While Iran might have 
seen it as a good decision at the time, it has left such organizations vulnerable to these kinds of 
claims. For the UK and the EU to brand an organization such as the IRGC as a terrorist 
organization in the same way USA has done would not be as risky as doing it to Iran. With the 
IRGC as a terrorist organization, the interdiction of the Grace 1 would have been against the 
IRGC, and as an act of self-defence in the fight against terrorism. Such self-defence would be 
in order to protect the UK, and the ship would then lose its innocence. Doing the same against 
other organizations or persons that are in support of the Assad-government would also not be 
outside the realms of possibility. To brand the Assad-government itself would be difficult 
though, both due to its recognition and support, and particularly because of its support from a 
permanent member of the SC.471 
5.2.4.3.4 Differences in forfeiture law 
While it would have been possible for the UK to theoretically categorize the IRGC as a terrorist 
organization and interdict the vessel that way, there are a clear difference between UK and US 
forfeiture law. US forfeiture law against targets considered terrorists gives the state an almost 
absolute power to seize and forfeit any asset involved or related to a terrorist or a terrorist 
organization, and make the seizure as a part of an in personam- or in rem action depending on 
the situation. UK law is not that flexible; there are some assets that can be seized without a 
direct relation to a crime, but those assets are part of an exhaustive list focused primarily on 
money laundering.472 It would be difficult, if not impossible for the UK at the moment of the 
Grace 1’s interdiction to actually make a case for the crude oil to be seized, or even detained 
under the conditions that the oil wouldn’t reach Syria. The law would have to be changed, 
 
471 That member being Russia (‘Current Members’ (United Nations Security Council)) 
<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members> accessed 12 December 2019. 
472 ATSCA Schedule 1 paragraph 10A. 
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possibly even at the EU level, to effectively interdict and keep cargo from passing ships to 
reach an unwanted destination.473 
5.2.4.3.5 Other problems with the terrorist argument 
Other than potential issues concerning implementation, there are other problems with the 
terrorist argument. What targets to be set as terrorists has to be very specific, and some targets 
might be impossible to brand as terrorists, either out of principles found in international law or 
purely on an economic or political level. Also, categorizing a certain target as a terrorist could 
have major backlash in the international community. It is therefore a tool with limited use. 
Another problem with it is its dependency on the SC, relying on an exception to another 
exception, which would make small changes in its interpretation risk changing the legality of 
the conduct. It also exists a problem regarding the definition of terrorism. The subjective 
interpretation does make it easier to categorize a target as a terrorist, but that also makes it 
easier for other states to do the same. With increased use, it could legitimize a conduct which 
could risk the security on the seas and effectively spell an end to innocent passage as we know 
it. 
5.2.5 Answer to the second research question 
Gibraltar is in a position that cannot be described in other words than completely unique; both 
geographically as well as politically. As part of the UK and subsequently the EU, it is part of 
an international legal body that is generally well accepted in the international community, and 
that usually tries to follow international regulation and law best it can. The UK itself is also an 
influential part of the international community in its own right, and even without the EU would 
still garner support from the community. Gibraltar’s unique position makes it possible for it to 
both implement a certain regime, and for this regime to more likely be accepted by the 
international community than if another state acted in the same way. Though the action was 
condemned by some and in actuality unlawful, it was in general not seen as such. Would 
Gibraltar continue with its practices, it would likely get a similar response. Another reason for 
this acceptance, is due to the acknowledgement of EU’s economic sanctions against the Assad-
government. The intent of the sanctions is admirable, and not many would combat sanctions 
aimed at stopping human rights violations done by a smaller, non-influential entity. Another 
reason is the tool itself being used. Economic sanctions as a tool, despite all its flaws and its 
received criticism, have become a part of modern international politics, as well as a natural part 
of non-violent conflicts between states. Economic sanctions might in the coming years not be 
seen in such a favourable light, but at this point of time it must be seen as an accepted form of 
economic action. The result of Gibraltar then continuing its conduct is clear: The use of an 
accepted tool by an entity such as Gibraltar, to accomplish something seen as admirable and 
with good intention, would likely have a direct impact on state practice. Gibraltar’s standard 
practice would change the state practice of what makes a vessel non-innocent, state practice 
being the only thing according to Yang that so far has been limiting the use of UNCLOS article 
19. This would allow other states to implement the same kind of regimes, deciding which states 
they want and do not want merchant vessels passing through their territorial sea to travel to. 
 
473 It could be argued that the only change needed would be an exhaustive list like ATSCA Schedule 1 
paragraph 10A, or add additional items to the already existing list, but that is a complicated issue concerning 
UK and EU legislative rules and is a topic for future research. 
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These merchant vessels would then risk being declared non-innocent and hindered, perhaps 
even seized as long as there would exist adequate proof of the vessel’s destination being the 
sanctioned entity. That would in turn result in an erosion of the right of innocent passage and 
have a severe negative impact on the freedom of the seas as well as having a negative impact 




The multiple questions surrounding the Grace 1’s interdiction are complex. It is not in essence 
a question about legality, but about if standard practice is capable of making the action legal 
and what the consequences of both the result of this legality and the consequence of the tool 
that would be used to make it so. The potential erosion of the right of innocent passage is 
troubling and would risk much of the freedom and opportunity on the seas that states have 
become accustomed to. There has already been signs of it eroding in favour of the principle of 
sovereignty, as the world itself becomes more and more complex. This complexity then needs 
increasingly complex solutions. If Gibraltar would continue to apply economic sanctions to 
neutral passing vessels, that would surely cement the erosion of the freedom of navigation, at 
least in the territorial sea. It would also conceivably create an exception to the right of innocent 
passage, an exception that then could be abused by coastal states, especially the coastal states 
that have territorial waters that are needed for safe navigation. However, even more troubling 
is perhaps the tool itself, economic sanctions: A tool used for what could be called economic 
warfare and which often could be considered discriminatory and damaging to an innocent 
population. The EU’s economic sanctions are no different, they could even arguably be used 
as a prime example of Lowe and Tzanakopoulos definition of economic warfare. The economic 
sanctions are there to force change, for the Assad-government to give in and give up. If you 
are to believe Joyner’s and Reisman’s assessment, the sanctions are also to be considered 
unlawful in accordance with international law. In any case, it is a dangerous tool to further 
legitimize and give further power to. 
The counterargument to all of this is that EU’s sanctions and Gibraltar’s interdiction was done 
with a good intent, with the intent to stop human rights violations, death, suffering, and institute 
democracy and freedom. The logic is then that actions that was done with a good intent would 
gain recognition, while actions that lacked this good intent would not. This is the same 
argument yet again that can be seen in the customary exception of the use of force to stop 
human rights violations, and builds upon it to some extent. However, that is a flawed argument. 
It is ultimately the tool that is legitimized, not the intent. Intents are subjective and can easily 
be twisted into other shapes that fits the user’s needs. Additionally, it is an argument ill-suited 
for the construction of legal structures. A legal structure where acts gets their legitimacy from 
their intention and success instead of getting its legitimacy from a foundation built upon legal 
principles, is a dangerous building to be standing on. Relying on such logic risks destabilizing 
international law, and it is precisely this logic that Gibraltar’s interdiction of the Grace 1 seems 
to rely on. It will be granted that the argument of intent carries some weight when used to argue 
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in favour of a military intervention to stop death and suffering, such as in the case of NATO’s 
intervention into Kosovo to stop ethnic cleansing, but not for the kind of action taken towards 
the Grace 1. 
If the UK via Gibraltar truly needed to interdict the Grace 1, it should have done so on the basis 
of ‘the terrorist argument’ that the USA operates under. Even if it would require changes to 
UK or EU law to make the interdiction process operate in an effective manner, it is a way that 
is legal and that would not erode the right of innocent passage or risk increasing the power of 
an already misused tool named economic sanctions. The argument as explained  contains some 
risks but faced with the potential legal ramifications of the use of economic sanctions to 
interdict a vessel in territorial waters, it seems to be the better option; at least in the specific 
case of the Grace 1. That is however not an endorsement of ‘the terrorist argument’. Even if 
the action would be considered legal and not be as impactful as the use of economic sanctions 
would, it does not mean that it carries no consequence. Using the SC’s exception designed to 
more effectively combat terrorism to instead interdict vessels benefitting the states own foreign 
policy is still an abuse of the exception, regardless of how legal it technically is.  
What should then Gibraltar have done, when faced with the question if it should interdict the 
Grace 1, to achieve its intentions of stopping the human rights violations in Syria? The question 
is complex but the answer is not. Gibraltar should not have interdicted the Grace 1, and in the 
best interest of the world, it will hopefully not try to do something like this again. This also 
serves as a warning to other coastal states in a similar situation which are tempted to replicate 
Gibraltar’s actions, as any positive gain would be offset by the consequences it could have on 
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